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In the Department of the Navy’s layered defense approach to protecting a computer 
network, it is the network’s administrators who provide the last layer of defense before 
the end user. Training network administrators is a rather expensive and time consuming 
process. However, this training needs to be provided on a regular basis in order to refresh 
their readiness and to train them to respond to new, emerging threats. Malicious Activity 
Simulation Tool (MAST) aims to provide realistic, tailored simulation of malicious 
activity for the purpose of training network administrators to recognize and respond to 
threats on the network they manage. 
In a continuation of MAST development, this thesis reports the testing and 
evaluation of the MAST functionality on a Local Area Network (LAN) using a Common 
PC Operating System Environment (COMPOSE) as its network operating system. We 
conclude that MAST can present realistic simulations of malicious activity that could be 
detected, recognized, and responded to by network administrators and host network, 
while posing no threat to the operational readiness of the host network or its supported 
missions. 
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Information security proficiency among many Department of Defense (DoD) 
network administrators, both afloat and ashore, is lacking [1]. In the face of the growing 
threats to our information systems, which become more and more essential to mission 
execution throughout the DoD, our network administrators must be able to recognize and 
respond to malicious activity. Due to budget constraints, network administrators are 
provided initial network administration training with cursory network security training. 
Beyond the this cursory network security training, a small percentage of these network 
administrators are given intermediate training on network security as it pertains to 
network defense (e.g., configuration of their network’s Access Control List, local security 
policies, and global policy objects). Once trained in network administration and the 
establishment of network security through defense-in-depth measures, members of the 
U.S. Navy’s Information Systems Technician (IT) work force is expected to continue 
developing their skills and improving upon skill sets established while attending Navy-
run IT schools. There is no provision for training network administrators to recognize and 
properly respond to malicious activity on the networks they administer. The Malicious 
Activity Simulation Tool (MAST) was designed to remedy this shortfall in training.  
MAST was incrementally designed and developed at the Naval Postgraduate 
School (Taff and Salveski [2], Neff [3], Longoria [4], Hammond [5], Hayes [6], Belli [7], 
and Lowney [8]) to provide commanding officers, network security instructors and 
network security evaluators with the ability to deliver a simulation of malicious activity 
to their target audience on the very network they are supposed to manage. Whether for 
initial development of network security skills, continued training in network security or 
evaluation of network security skills in the IT work force, MAST aims to provide a 
realistic, tailored simulation of malicious activity. MAST is designed to be flexible 
enough to meet the intent of the training as well as the ability of the training audience. 
Because network administrators must be ready to respond to malicious activity on their 
networks, MAST should be able to run its simulations on the same network without 
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causing a reduction in the network’s operational readiness or availability. We discuss this 
further in Chapter III.  
A. OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this research is to test and evaluate the functionality of MAST in 
execution of its simulations on a LAN utilizing the COMPOSE variant as its operating 
system. Our tests and evaluations determined MAST is capable of executing the defined 
simulations and is compatible with the COMPOSE operating system. Common PC 
Operating System Environment (COMPOSE) is a bundle of software, managed by The 
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR). COMPOSE software suite 
includes: the operating system, and all software applications. COMPOSE provides afloat 
platforms with a consolidated software suite that meets the Navy’s operational 
requirements.  
Guided by the test plan presented in [5], there are two overall objectives for our 
quantitative testing of MAST: 
• Assess the compatibility of MAST with the COMPOSE environment, both 
when idle and while executing Simware modules 
• Verify the functionality of the MAST Kill Switch on a physical network 
All functions, which MAST executes in the delivery of its simulations, were 
evaluated. Our research created a two-fold process of testing and evaluating not only the 
functions of MAST as they pertain to its loading, configuration capabilities, execution of 
malware simulations, hereinafter referred to as Simware, and termination of said 
Simware, but also as it pertains to the compatibility of these functions with the rest of the 
applications within a COMPOSE operating system and the operating system itself. 
Our research focused solely on the whether or not MAST met its functional 
requirements on the Department of the Navy’s (DON) COMPOSE operating system and 
none others. It is not within the scope of this thesis to begin any certification and 
accreditation efforts. Confidence in the MAST program’s ability to function on a LAN 
using the COMPOSE operating system was established through a comparison of the 
 3 
functional requirements that shaped the MAST program’s design to the functionality 
displayed by the MAST program in a test environment.  
B. METHODOLOGY 
Our test methodology was influenced by the Operational Test Director’s Manual 
(COMOPTEVFORINST 3980.2) [9] and drew from the quantitative testing process 
presented by Lieutenant Hayes in his thesis [6]. We executed our tests of MAST, its 
Simware modules and its Kill Switch, in two separate environments. First, we built a test 
and evaluation network at Naval Postgraduate School that was configured as a U.S. Navy 
shipboard network using COMPOSE as the operating system. By complying with DoD 
and DON configuration guidance, this test and evaluation network, referred to henceforth 
as the MAST Test Bed, replicated an operational Navy shipboard network. Second, we 
validated our test findings by executing the same tests of MAST in a DoD-certified and 
accredited environment, the Navy Cyber Operations Range (NCOR). 
This thesis conducted an evaluation of network behavior during malware injection 
simulation. The thesis verified COMPOSE compatibility by:  
• Inspecting application, security, and system logs on each server and 
workstation while MAST is idle and while MAST is executing Simware 
modules. 
• Verifying the functionality of the MAST Kill Switch. 
• Verifying the proper de-installation and removal of MAST.  
The thesis researched and documented host and network resource usage to include 
memory and processes resources. Data was collected from each workstation and server in 
accordance with the test methodology suggested in [6]. Further explanation of 
methodology, data collection, and analysis is provided in Chapter IV. 
C. BENEFITS OF THIS RESEARCH TO THE DOD/DON 
In the DON’s layered defense approach to protecting a computer network, it is the 
network’s administrators who manage the last layer of defense before the end user. 
Training network administrators is a rather expensive and time consuming process but 
this training needs to be provided on a regular basis to refresh their readiness and to train 
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them to respond to new, emerging threats. MAST aims to provide a realistic, tailored 
simulation of malicious activity for the purpose of training network administrators to 
recognize and respond to threats on the networks they manage. It can also be used as a 
network security evaluation tool generating scenarios similar to ones executed by DoD 
Red Teams. This research established the value of MAST in the context of how it may 
aid the DON and DoD efforts to improve the training of its network administrators in a 
time of great need for more capable network defenders able to ensure the freedom of 
maneuver in cyberspace coupled with a time of fiscal judiciousness and an austere 
funding environment throughout the DoD. The benefits of this research to the DoD and 
DON are further explained in Chapter II. 
D. ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of this document proceeds as follows: 
Chapter II establishes a foundation for this research by providing information 
about the potential threats to not just DoD networks, but all networks connected to the 
Internet. It discusses the fundamental network security objectives of confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability as well as how malicious actors or threat agents maliciously 
compromise these objectives to gain access to a network, its users, and the information 
contained therein. It also historically explains how MAST has progressed toward a 
solution that will enable the DoD to better equip network administrators to identify and 
respond to attacks from these threat agents. 
Chapter III describes the design considerations of our experimentation. We take a 
deeper look at the elements required to produce a realistic, tailored simulation of 
malicious activity with the intent of facilitating effective training for operational 
readiness in cyberspace. In order to better understand the motivation behind the design of 
MAST, we explore the shortfall of network self-defense that exists in the DoD. As a 
castle requires both layers of defense as well as the ability to dynamically defend itself 
against whatever manner of attack threatens the security and safety of its occupants, so 
too does a DoD network in order to protect its users and information. Today’s networks 
possess defense-in-depth architectures governed by policy, regulated by appointed 
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institutions, and routinely assessed through inspections and evaluative exercises. What is 
missing is the ability to dynamically defend the network. DoD network administrators 
require a training environment where they can encounter inert examples of known 
malicious behavior against which they can develop and strengthen their cyber self-
defense tradecraft. Chapter III explains how MAST aims to deliver this environment. It 
also describes the design of the testing environments used to evaluate MAST’s 
compatibility with the COMPOSE environment.  
Chapter IV discusses in detail the methodology of our test and evaluation of the 
functionality of MAST system on our two test environments. In it, we explain the efforts 
made to ensure the MAST Test Bed replicated an operational shipboard network. In 
addition, we describe our investigative efforts to ensure the realistic simulation of 
malicious activity drove the development of both Simware modules. We also capture the 
logical and physical differences between our two testing environments: The MAST Test 
Bed at the Naval Postgraduate School and the Navy Cyber Operations Range (NCOR) at 
the Navy Information Operations Command (NIOC) in Norfolk, VA. Finally, we present 
the analysis and results from our tests in both environments.  
Chapter V summarizes the discussions, descriptions and explanations made 
throughout this paper. It provides the conclusion drawn from the results of our test and 
evaluation of MAST. It provides a summary of recommended measures that should be 
addressed or resolved before a commander would be inclined to allow the MAST 
program to be installed on their operational network. It concludes with several 
recommendations for future work to include continued collaboration with the NCOR and 
further advancements in malicious activity simulation. 
 6 
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II. BACKGROUND 
Disreputable activities on the Internet vary in complexity from simple and 
primitive to advanced, persistent, and calculated. In order to better understand how the 
Simware used in our research creates a mock representation of the threats faced by our 
networks, we must properly explain the disreputable side of the Internet. To do that, we 
begin by identifying and defining the three fundamental objectives of network security. 
Network security personnel focus on these objectives when shaping their plans for 
defending their network. Nefarious individuals focus on these objectives for polar 
opposite reasons. As an example, a network administrator must take measures to ensure 
the confidentiality of sensitive information stored on his network. An attacker wanting to 
gain access to this sensitive information seeks to violate that confidentiality.  
With an understanding of the core network security objectives, we explain the 
concept of a threat. We describe the type of person who acts on these threats. We then 
provide an overview of the types of malicious software, or malware, and malicious 
activity employed by these attackers. These explanations give a context to the simulated 
malicious environments we create with MAST’s Simware. We close the chapter with a 
brief discussion of the works of all previous MAST project research phases. 
A. THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES OF NETWORK SECURITY 
Whether discussing physical security or network security, all security programs 
are shaped around a balance between the organization’s efforts to execute its missions 
and to provide assurance in the tools needed to conduct mission-supporting operations. A 
military command is similar to an investment bank or any other civilian business in that it 
seeks a balance between securing the information and information systems required to 
execute its assigned missions and not hindering its ability to execute assigned tasking due 
to implementation of excessive security measures. Some organizations may have specific, 
legally mandated, security requirements. For example, health care providers must 
implement security measures in accordance with the Health Information Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 or face stiff penalties. The end decision on how an 
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organization will balance its business goals, security goals, and security requirements 
shapes the objectives of its security policies. These security objectives vary from one 
organization to the next in size and complexity. All objectives, regardless of the 
organization, address one or more of the fundamental objectives of security: 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. All three objectives are defined in Title III of 
the E-Government Act, also known as the Federal Information Security Management Act 
(FISMA) [10].  
1. Confidentiality 
Ensuring confidentiality of data means preventing the unauthorized access 
to or disclosure of sensitive information, whether personal or proprietary in nature 
[10]. Security measures that address confidentiality protect sensitive data at rest as 
well as while in transit. They also address protection of the systems that process 
and contain the data and even the facilities containing these systems. 
2. Integrity 
When you provide for the integrity of information you guard against the 
unauthorized modification or destruction of information [10]. While a confidential 
network ensures sensitive data is created, transferred, and stored in a manner that 
prevents unauthorized access or disclosure, a network ensures that data’s integrity 
by guarding against any unauthorized manipulation, whether intentional or 
unintentional.  
3. Availability 
Ensuring the availability of information requires provisions for access to 
that information in a timely and reliable manner [10]. Unauthorized disruptions in 
access to information or information systems is a violation of the availability 
principle. 
Network administrators will take actions to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of the information and information systems relied upon by their 
organizations. They will deploy firewalls at their network perimeters to prevent 
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unauthorized access to their network. They will require users to encrypt e-mail with the 
recipient’s public key when sending attachments to protect the confidentiality of the 
attachment in transit. They will ensure their anti-virus signature definitions are up to date 
in order to detect malware designed to attack the availability of resources like computer 
processing and network bandwidth. These measures are pro-active in nature and are 
intended to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the organization’s 
information and information systems from the attackers who would exploit them.  
B. THREATS AND THREAT AGENTS  
As an organization shapes its security objectives to provide for confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of its assets, it must take into consideration several factors. The 
security team must identify: 
• Any vulnerabilities in their assets 
• Any threats that can exploit these vulnerabilities 
• The risk posed by these vulnerabilities to the organization 
• The countermeasures the organization will employ to offset these 
vulnerabilities   
Shon Harris’s book, CISSP All-in-One Exam Guide, is a good source of 
fundamental security definitions [11]. As such, our following definitions are derived from 
hers. Vulnerabilities are any weakness that may enable an attacker to violate the 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information or information systems. 
Vulnerabilities may be present in the way information is created, processed, transmitted, 
stored, or destroyed. They may be present at any layer of the Open Systems 
Interconnection (OSI) Model. A threat is the potential danger posed to the information or 
information systems by a vulnerability. A threat may be internal or external to the 
information system or network. Threats may be executed by either benign or malicious 
agents. A system administrator who does not know how to properly configure the system 
security mechanisms is a benign threat, whereas an attacker is malicious. There must be 
intent for someone to be considered an attacker. The risk associated with a vulnerability 
is the likelihood a threat agent will act on the vulnerability. Risk also takes into 
consideration the business impact this action would have on the organization. Anything 
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put in place to mitigate risk posed by a vulnerability is called a countermeasure. A 
countermeasure may eliminate the vulnerability or reduce how affective a threat agent 
would be at exploiting the vulnerability.  
To explain these terms in context, consider the vulnerability of a laptop not using 
the latest virus signatures database for its anti-virus software. The vulnerability is the 
system is susceptible to infection. The threat is the potential harm the laptop or 
information stored on it faces by an undetected virus. The threat agent is the mechanism 
by which the virus is introduced into the system. The risk takes into consideration what 
damage the malicious code could do to the laptop’s confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability as well as what that means to the organization. The business impact portion 
of risk plays an important role in the determining which countermeasures to employ.  
In the last decade, the information security environment has changed. Information 
security providers have reported a marked increase in the number of targeted attacks on 
information systems and networks. Attacks may come from epidemic, resource-impeding 
malware such as the Conficker worm [12] or may be directed at specific targets with 
specific intent. These attacks come from threat agents or attackers that may be grouped 
into several different categories. During his keynote presentation to the 2012 Hack in 
Paris conference, Mikko Hypponen, Chief Research Officer for the Internet security 
company F-Secure, explained that most cyber security attacks originate from three 
sources: criminals, hacktivists, and governments [13].  
1. Criminals 
The Internet continues to become more and more a part of normal, everyday life 
for most citizens of the world. Parents purchase school clothes on-line for their children. 
Students register for classes. Friends stay connected across great geographical distances 
via social media, video-enabled web conferencing, and massively multiplayer online role-
playing games (MMORPG). During all of these Internet-based exchanges and 
transactions, the Internet user must establish his identity by providing credentials. Once 
the user’s identity is authenticated, it is assumed any transactions conducted are made by 
the actual user. The credentials establish the integrity, and in some cases the 
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confidentiality, of these transactions. If an unscrupulous individual or organization came 
into possession of the user’s credentials, they could conduct fund transfers from the 
user’s bank accounts, access personally identifiable information (PII), open additional 
lines of credit in the user’s name, and even purchase goods with the fraudulently 
established new line of credit. Any Internet-based transaction that requires a person to 
authenticate himself could be conducted under the ruse that the attacker was the victim. 
This is what cyber criminals do. They exploit our reliance on the Internet for their own 
ill-gotten gains. Cyber criminals vary in skill level and citizenship. The line 
distinguishing cyber criminals from government and hacktivists is the motivation behind 
their malfeasance. In its 2011 Internet Crime Report, the Internet Crime Complaint 
Center (IC3) stated there were more than 300,000 complaints of online criminal activity 
in the United States for that year [14]. In addition to conducting malicious activity for the 
purpose of making profit, some cyber criminals and criminal organizations make 
themselves available for hire to anyone who wishes to use their nefarious tradecraft. Not 
limiting their skill set to just identity theft, cyber criminals may be hired to conduct 
industrial espionage, denial of service (DoS) attacks, and fraudulent manipulation of data 
stored in computer-based records. 
2. Hacktivists 
The Vietnam War produced a well-documented time of political activism in U.S. 
history. Political activists expressed disapproval of the War and questioned its legality 
over a wide spectrum of activity. Protest events ranged from peaceful sit-ins and marches 
to displays of violence. More recently in history, the infusion of computing technology 
and society has enabled another venue for expression of support of, or opposition to, 
political issues. Impedance of the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the Internet 
or Internet-based services in support of political activism is known as hacktivism. 
François Paget, a senior malware research engineer at McAfee Labs, wrote a white paper 




• The 1981 establishment of The Chaos Computer Club in Berlin 
• The WANK (Worms Against Nuclear Killers) worm that attacked a 
NASA network in 1989 
• The hacker group UrBan Ka0S attacks of Indonesian government websites 
to protest oppressive conditions in Timor 
• The 2001 DoS attack on the Lufthansa website in protest of the German 
government’s use of its aircraft to deport undocumented migrants out of 
Germany.  
Paget identifies three major groups of hacktivists and provides examples of each. The 
first group is a specific group, Anonymous. Anonymous began as a group of Internet 
Relay Chat (IRC) personas who put their hacking skills to use as they protested perceived 
overstepping of moral boundaries. Their use of malicious activity to present their political 
case mostly consisted of degrading or denying access to websites through DDoS attacks 
[15]. A targeted website would receive a large quantity of queries from workstations 
under the control of Anonymous members. The workstations launched these queries 
using an open-source, DoS creation tool known as the Low Orbit Ion Canon (LOIC) [15]. 
The volume of queries would saturate the website’s infrastructure making it unavailable 
to legitimate web traffic queries. Their numbers grew as the Anonymous movement 
shifted from politically-motivated pranks to main-stream hacktivism.  
The hacktivists of the Arab Spring embody Paget’s second hacktivism group, the 
cyberoccupiers. Cyberoccupiers rely on Internet-based social networks to present their 
political views, spread propaganda, and recruit additional members [15]. Unlike 
Anonymous, cyberoccupiers do not use denial or degradation of services as a means to 
present their case. In fact, they rely on such services to conduct their form of hactivism. 
Cyberoccupiers used social media sites as the planning vehicle for protests in countries 
like Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. When the governments of these countries attempted to 
control the world media’s coverage of these events, cyberoccupiers in these countries and 
around the world collaborated to get audio and video files on the Internet, giving a 
globalized voice to their cause. Whereas cyberoccupiers are motivated by their loss of 
support for a ruling political power, the third hacktivism group contrasts their motivation.  
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Paget’s third hacktivism group is called the patriots and cyber warriors. In calling 
this third group “cyber warriors,” Paget is not implying an official, state-sponsored 
military organization. Instead, these hacktivists behave like fundamentalists These 
hacktivists thrive in totalitarian countries and conduct attacks as expression of support  
for national and extremist moments [15]. The 2007 cyber-attacks on Estonia and the  
2008 cyber-attacks on Georgia were reportedly perpetrated by patriotic Russian hackers. 
In the case of Estonia’s cyber-attack, the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks on 
Estonia’s banking, government, and media websites were coordinated and executed by 
the Nashi, a Russian youth organization with political ties to the Putin administration. 
3. Governments 
Hacktivists and, at times, criminals are willing to openly acknowledge their 
conduct of cyber-attacks. In contrast, there are few, if any, government organizations 
willing to publicly acknowledge their own conduct of cyber-attacks. Although proof of 
government sponsorship of malicious activities executed in support of national security 
policies may exist at a higher classification, this is an unclassified thesis and, therefore, 
will not address government cyber intelligence or its collection. At the unclassified level, 
open media provides that the identification of governments as the third source of most 
cyber-attacks stems from intelligence collected by private industry. Network security 
solution providers like F-Secure based out of Finland, McAfee and Symantec based out 
of the U.S., and Kaspersky Labs headquartered in Russia, are in the business of 
identifying malware present on the Internet, developing anti-virus signatures to facilitate 
detection and prevention of malware, and learning how to remove the malware from the 
infected machines of their clients. The origin of malicious code, and with some inference, 
the creator of the malicious code, may be revealed during the analysis process. This is 
how cyber experts like F-Secure’s Mikko Hypponen can implicate governments as being 
a source of cyber-attacks when no government has formally acknowledged such actions. 
One such formal implication was made by Mandiant, a cyber security firm, in February, 
2013. In their report, they identify an advanced persistent threat (APT) responsible for 
computer security breaches across the globe. The report contains forensic evidence that 
the Chinese government may be directly linked to this threat [16]. 
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C. MALICIOUS SOFTWARE 
Computing devices utilize code to provide the user with capabilities. Installed 
software applications (e.g., web browsers, on-line video chat tools, word processing 
programs), internal and external hardware (e.g., memory chips, internal wireless network 
interface cards, video cards), and attached peripheral devices (e.g., keyboard, monitor, 
mouse, printer) all require the presence or absence of an electric signal, which translates 
to code that tells them what to do. Firmware and software programs provide the 
computer’s processor with input data. The processor is the brain of all computing 
functions, whether in a personal computer or in the Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) equipment used to control flow valves at municipal water 
treatment plants. The functional relationship between the processor brain and the 
appendages of software and hardware relies on an assumption that all signals sent and 
received are not manipulated or interrupted in any manner. In other words, the signal 
integrity is intact. If a program can be written to accomplish productive work, a program 
can also be written to accomplish destructive work.  
It is possible to create software that produces a desired effect, malicious in nature, 
by exploiting the electric signals tied to computing technology. In 2005, Troy Nash, a 
member of the Vulnerability and Risk Assessment Program at Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory, published a case study on ways to improve control system security. 
In this report, he provides his definition of malicious software, or malware, as: 
Programming (code, scripts, active content, and other software) designed 
to disrupt or deny operation, gather information that leads to loss of 
privacy or exploitation, gain unauthorized access to system resources, and 
other abusive behavior. [17]  
One example of malware is a computer virus. To detect and protect a computer against 
infection from a computer virus, network administrators employ anti-virus software. 
Anti-virus software relies on virus signatures to identify and quarantine or remove 
malware before the file is allowed to access or remain on the protected network, work 
station, or device. A virus signature is a copy of the malicious code or DNA of a virus 
[18]. A virus, or any other malware, for that matter, is detected by two means, generic 
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detection and heuristic detection. In generic detection, anti-virus software scan a file and 
compare it with existing signatures of known viruses. In heuristic detection, the virus is 
not detected by its signature but by its behavior when executing its malicious intent. 
Unfortunately, modern malware designers are becoming more adroit at obfuscating of 
their malicious code. Code obfuscation involves transforming the program to hide its 
intent while maintaining its intended function [18]. Obfuscated malware, Virus A, for 
example, avoids detection by anti-virus software because it looks different than the virus 
signature for Virus A loaded into the anti-virus software’s signature database. Malware 
may also go undetected by anti-virus software scans if the virus signature for that virus 
has not be created. In order for a signature to be created, an anti-virus company must 
know of the exploit and write a signature based on its characteristics. 
 Whether undetected because of obfuscation or the lack of virus signature, a virus 
may still be identified by its functionality. A network administrator does not necessarily 
need a report from the network’s anti-virus program to know a worm may be the cause 
behind a significant degradation in available network bandwidth. Malware may be 
grouped into several categories. Provided below are the general functionalities of each. 
Identifying the presence of malware on a workstation based on its functionality is not an 
easy feat. Like a human ailment, malware “symptoms” or functionality may span several 
of these categories making it difficult to identify and treat [19]. 
1. Virus 
A virus is self-replicating program that attaches to files in the infected machine, 
often for the purpose of corrupting or deleting files on that machine. It replicates in order 
to facilitate spreading from one file to another on the same machine. The spread of a 
virus from one computer to another requires the transfer of the infected file via contact 
through removable storage media, network connectivity, or the Internet. 
2. Worm 
Like a virus, a worm is self-replicating. Unlike a virus, it does not depend on a 
host file to function. Its purpose is propagation not destruction. As mentioned earlier, 
while the worm replicates and spreads from machine to machine, it may be detected by 
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the increasing amount of network bandwidth absorbed for the act of propagation. The 
more are machines infected by the worm, the more worm files are generated. The more 
worm files generated, the more files propagated to other network devices. Robert Morris, 
a first-year computer science graduate student at Cornell University, infected several 
thousand computers throughout the United States with a worm he created to exploit 
security flaws in the UNIX operating system. [20]. 
3. Downloader 
The main purpose of a downloader file is to download and install files. These files 
may be additional malware used by an attacker to further establish unfettered access to 
the infected workstation and, as a result, the associated network. In order for this malware 
type to be successful, the infected workstation must have connectivity to the site from 
which the downloader will download additional malware [19].  
4. Launcher 
A launcher program activates other malware. An example of this is a Trojan 
horse, a program, usually legitimate, that is modified to contain malicious functionality. 
The Trojan horse, when activated, launches the payload malware contained within. The 
payload itself is usually also malicious in nature. As a result, network administrators may 
detect the payload deployment and not the launcher itself. To make detection even more 
difficult, they usually rely on nontraditional techniques to hide their activity [19]. 
5. Information-stealing Malware 
This malware collects information based on its design and sends off the infected 
computer in a manner that enables the attacker to retrieve it. A keylogging malware will 
capture any and all characters typed on the associated keyboard. A password grabber 
scans the computer for hashes stored locally when a user selects to be remembered by his 
bank’s website while logging into his banking account. 
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6. Backdoor 
A backdoor bypasses security mechanisms allowing uncontested access to a 
computer program. Sometimes programmers put them in place to facilitate 
troubleshooting faulty software. Attackers either exploit existing backdoors once 
discovered or put them in place to facilitate uncontested access to a workstation on the 
network. From the victim workstation, an attacker can stage additional attacks on other 
network machines difficult to execute external to the network since most security 
programs protect the network from unauthenticated, external access. Backdoors, 
sometimes referred to as “trap doors,” facilitate internal threats to a network’s security. If 
machines infected by a backdoor receive commands from the same command and control 
server they form a botnet [19]. The infected machines are called bots or zombies. 
7. Rootkit 
Root kits hide in and exploit the base functionality of the host operating system in 
order to facilitate control of certain aspects of that operating system while remaining 
hidden [21]. Rootkits are installed once an attacker has gained access to the machine and 
has found a way to exploit the authentication process allowing him to install the root kit 
as an administrator. It uses the administrator or root level privileges to take actions to 
hide itself and other malware. Put simply, it is a “kit” that allows the attacker to establish 
and retain “root” access [21]. 
D. MALICIOUS ACTIVITY 
Malware enables an attacker to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of computer networks, systems, or information contained within. Although 
malware may be unintentionally deployed on a system, the design of malware is 
intentional. Its maker had specific intent for it when considering its design. Some 
programs are not intentionally malicious. How they are used may be malicious. As an 
example, “rm –r *.*” is an example of a misuse of the useful UNIX command remove, or 
“rm.” Like the variants of the types of malware discussed above, there are many ways an 
unauthorized person may gain access to a computer. Once on the computer, the person is 
inside the castle walls. Like a castle, the bulk of a network’s defenses focus on preventing 
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access to unauthorized persons. Many defense-in-depth security architectures are 
designed with the assumption that any activity on the inside of the network’s defenses is 
legitimate and, therefore, warrants less monitoring or restraints. The methodology with 
which an attacker advances his attack is described in the Certified Ethical Hacking 
Manual [22]. The phases of an attack are:  
• Reconnaissance 
• Scanning 
• Gaining access 
• Maintaining access 
• Clearing tracks 
By the nature of its design, malware will enable one or more of these phases. A 
malware that conducts a port scan would be employed during the scanning phase. During 
the reconnaissance phase, a socially engineering attack in the form of an e-mail from a 
legitimate source may contain a virus or a hyper-link to a malicious website containing 
drive-by download malware, a type of downloader. Both an e-mail attachment and 
malicious scripts hidden in a website may be used to enable the attacker’s efforts in the 
gaining access phase. During the clearing tracks phase, a malicious pop-up window may 
have a script tied to its “Close” button that launches an evidence-erasing virus when 
selected by the user. 
1. Port Scans 
Computers send and receive traffic based upon standards and agreements made 
during session establishment. Both the sender and receiver of network traffic identify the 
port numbers from which data will be transmitted from and to. The port numbers 
associated with a transmission act as mailing addresses for network traffic. An e-mail 
sent from a mail server to a work station will be directed at Port 25, which is dedicated to 
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol traffic. When someone uses a web browser to reach the 
local newspaper’s website, their computer establishes a connection with the web server 
hosting the website via Port 80, Hypertext Terminal Protocol (HTTP). Port scanning 
software has a legitimate purpose. It is used by network administrators to verify the 
network is in compliance with the network security policy as well as for checking service 
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availability. It also may be used by attackers during their scanning phase to identify open 
ports or services offered by a targeted network. Equipped with target Internet Protocol 
(IP) addresses gained during the reconnaissance phase, the attackers exploit the 
functionality the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [23]. A TCP segment has flags 
that provide guidance during the establishment, management of, and disestablishment of 
a session between sender and receiver. The flags are abbreviated URG for “Urgent,” 
ACK for “Acknowledge,” PSH for “Push,” RST for “Reset,” SYN for a “Synchronize,” 
and FIN for “Finish.”  A network compliant with the TCP specification (RFC 793) may 
be exploited into divulging which ports in its firewall are open and which are closed [23]. 
Programmers have developed software programs like NMAP (Network Mapping 
Protocol) that automate port scanning. Port scanning is the process of sending segments 
to a target IP address to multiple ports and with different combinations of TCP flags. The 
information returned allows the attacker to guess what operating system is running on the 
target machine as well as what services (e.g., web server, File Transfer Protocol (FTP) 
server, mail server) are running on the target machine. With this information, the attacker 
identifies exploits of the operating system and software used in providing these network 
services in order to select the tools he will use to conduct his attack. 
2. Social Engineering Attacks 
An attacker conducting a social engineering attack is utilizing his social skills and 
knowledge of human interaction to manipulate the target into doing what he wants. In 
this type of attack the target is a human and not a workstation or network. The goal of 
most social engineering attacks is to capture credentials tied to user’s personality, lines of 
credit, or banking accounts [11].  
A social engineering attack may also convince a person to click on an e-mail’s 
embedded hyperlink or to open an attachment. Most mail servers are configured to block 
e-mail attachments that are executable files. Anti-virus programs play another role in 
preventing the delivery of attachments that match a signature of a known malware. A 
hyperlink is not an attachment. Again, a properly configured mail server can remove 
hyperlinks from e-mails before they are delivered. The end user is not defenseless in the 
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absence of this mail server configuration. Users may change the options of their mail 
program to convert all e-mails to text only. Regardless, malicious attachments and 
hyperlinks may still get through these security measures and arrive in a target’s inbox. 
Also, a user may select to copy the uniform resource locator (URL) of the malicious 
website from the socially engineered e-mail and paste it into the address bar of their web 
browser. Once opened, the attachment may be a Trojan horse, a downloader, or an 
information-stealing malware depending on what the attacker requires to advance his 
attack to the next phase. 
Malicious links may direct the user to malicious websites containing malicious 
java script enabling the attacker to further compromise the security of the user’s 
workstation. The malicious website may contain false links that fool the user into 
downloading malware. The hyperlinks might even take the user to legitimate websites 
whose web-hosting servers have been compromised. For example, attackers wishing to 
hide their malicious content from web administrators may use zero-pixel iframes. An 
iframe, or inline frame, is used when the web designer wants to embed a separate 
document within the current web page [24]. A zero-pixel iframe is too small to see. The 
iframe, injected at the compromised web-hosting server, may contain malicious java 
script that may manipulate the victim web browser to visit other malicious sites designed 
by the attacker containing additional malware. The intent is to re-direct the user’s 
legitimate Internet traffic to these malicious sites where he will be persuaded to download 
malware that gives the attacker access to the machine and, subsequently, the attached 
network.  
Malicious pop-up windows are another vehicle of social engineering attacks. 
There are various reasons for pop-up windows. A network administrator may use a pop-
up window to send notice to users that an emergent system reboot is required to finish the 
installation of a software update. Some system reboot notifications come with radio 
buttons providing the user options such as “Restart Now,” “Delay Restart,” and “Cancel.”  
websites use pop-up windows to provide advertisements to the user. The designer of a 
malicious pop-up window will tie malicious code to the radio buttons. When the user 
clicks on a malicious radio button within the pop-up window, malicious java script 
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downloads malware to the victim machine providing the same control to the attacker as 
mentioned above [25]. 
E. CYBER SECURITY INTIATIVES IN THE DOD  
1. Dynamic Approach to Network Defense 
In the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report, then Secretary of 
Defense (SECDEF) Robert Gates set the course toward improving the readiness of DoD 
networks to operate in cyberspace by identifying a need for greater capability to defend 
against attacks in cyberspace. SECDEF Gates underlined a demand for improvement in 
existing capabilities to counter threats existing in cyberspace [26]. The threats to the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of DoD networks posed significant potential to 
hinder the DoD’s ability to execute its missions. This guidance from the office of the 
SECDEF led to the DoD identifying cyberspace as a warfare domain. U.S. Cyber 
Command (USCYBERCOM) was established and assigned the mission of ensuring the 
secure use of cyberspace by the DoD for the execution of U.S. National Policy. 
USCYBERCOM’s Concept of Operations (CONOPS) identified Lines of Operations 
(LOO): DoD Global Information Grid (GIG) Operations (DGO), Defensive Cyber 
Operations (DCO), and Offensive Cyber Operations (OCO) [27]. The portion of 
USCYBERCOM’s mission that was not receiving due diligence was ensuring the 
operations of the GIG. DGO is the USCYBERCOM LOO responsible for ensuring 
continued operations of the GIG. DGO covers the creation, maintenance, and protection 
of all DoD networks [27]. Whereas DCO provides for the defense of DoD networks and 
their access to and use of the GIG, DGO provides protection in the form of self-defense.  
To date, existing self-defense operations include ensuring a network is equipped 
with properly configured firewalls, running anti-virus applications with up-to-date anti-
virus signatures, operating with the latest vendor-supplied updates for the operating 
system and applications running on the network, and ensuring no unauthorized 
applications are running on the network. This defense-in-depth concept assumes that, 
once in place, the overlapping “layers” will ensure the safety of the network from 
malicious activity and malware. It is a static approach to providing self-defense against a 
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dynamic threat. Not only is the network and its information dynamic but the threats are 
also dynamic. In his 2001 article “Learning to Operate in Cyberspace,” Rear Admiral 
(Upper Half) William E. Leigher, Director of Warfare Integration for Information 
Dominance (OPNAV N2/N6F) [1], captured the direness of the state of DGO efforts in 
the DoD. He expressed concern for current objectives of operations in cyberspace stating 
such objectives would not be accepted in any of the other warfare domains [1]. RDML 
Leigher noted that the effort to provide a well-fortified network does not prevent all 
attacks. A dynamic approach to self-defense is required to address a dynamic threat. 
Shipboard damage control readiness provides an example of how to dynamically 
approach network self-defense shortfalls. 
2. Casualty Responsiveness on the Network 
The threat to a U.S. Navy ship’s operational readiness from fire or flooding is 
great. Upon entering service in the U.S. Navy, enlisted and officer ranks are provided 
initial shipboard damage control and firefighting training. Both enlisted and officer alike 
learn how to respond to fire and flooding casualties. They gain cursory knowledge of 
their casualty-fighting equipment and procedures. These tried and true casualty response 
procedures and methodologies are developed from lessons learned by real crews facing 
actual fire and flooding casualties. The training scenarios are well-planned to ensure 
realistic simulation of actual casualties experienced in the Fleet. To ensure a realistic 
simulation, the training environments are designed to closely reflect operational spaces in 
which the training audience might encounter fire and flooding while at sea. The skills 
gained during initial training are re-enforced when assigned to a Navy ship. Through 
continued training, these crew members, when assigned to the ship’s damage control or 
firefighting teams, gain a familiarity with their equipment, their procedures, and their 
ship. They develop procedural memory, or “muscle-memory,” through repetitive damage 
control and firefighting drills. This “muscle-memory” is vital to ensuring fast and 
effective response of the damage control and firefighting teams. Familiar with their 
equipment and well-exercised in their casualty response procedures, these teams are 
empowered to gain control of a casualty and quickly return the ship to its full operational 
capacity. 
 23 
Like a ship’s crew ensuring its readiness to respond to a fire or flooding casualty, 
network administrators require an avenue with which to re-enforce and further develop 
network casualty response skills while also developing a familiarity with their network. 
They need to learn the strengths and weaknesses of themselves and those of their fellow 
network administrators. The threats faced by DoD networks were discussed in Chapter II. 
Some of these threats fall outside of the scope of network self-defense and require the 
capabilities provided by the DCO mission. Some threats do fall within the means of a 
network administrator to detect, either by human observation or detection by software or 
hardware readily available to them. It is the detectable threat that DoD network 
administrators need the opportunity to face in a simulated environment mirroring the 
operational networks they are responsible to create, maintain, and protect. Having the 
opportunity to develop and practice their cyber casualty response trade craft establishes a 
higher probability that network administrators will successfully combat actual threats and 
the resultant damage sustained by the network. The DoD utilize red teams, groups of 
ethical hackers, to run simulated attacks on DoD networks in order to assess the cyber 
readiness of its networks and administrators. Unfortunately, these assessments are 
performed, at best, once or twice a year. In addition, there are no training sessions of any 
kind in which cyber threat simulation is provided to allow network administrators the 
opportunity to hone network casualty response and damage control skills. In fact, most 
techniques and procedures, if in existence, are home-grown and not doctrinal in nature. 
The interval between training opportunities is too great for any skill to be effectively 
developed and retained.  
Red teams are not the solution. The DoD needs a cyber damage control training 
environment. Red team assessments of command network defense are too infrequent for 
the network administrators to experience the variety and repetition of attacks necessary to 
develop the familiarity and skills required of them. This infrequency is due to funding 
constraints, which limit the DoD red team growth in a time when the demand signal for 
cyber assessments and training continues to increase. More importantly, creating a 
training environment is not the purpose of a red team. They are an inspection entity 
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responsible for assessing the cyber readiness of a network and the ability of its network 
administrators to provide self-defense.  
What is required is a cyber damage control training tool capable of simulating real 
cyber casualties while safely providing this simulation without threat to the operational 
readiness of the host network. This cyber damage control trainer should be readily 
available at the unit level to facilitate training opportunities as frequent as the unit level 
commander deems necessary and at times of his or her choosing. 
F. AN OVERVIEW OF MAST 
MAST aims to deliver scalable, safe, and realistic simulation of malicious activity 
to network administrators and operators. MAST is an excellent tool for developing, 
improving upon, and assessing cyber readiness of its target audience. Its simulations may 
be utilized to conduct initial malicious activity recognition and response training, to re-
enforce that training through repetitive exposure, or to assess the effectiveness of that 
training. The target audience may be the network administrators who will act as first 
responders to an incident of malicious activity on the network. It may also be the network 
users who provide for a greater security posture of the network if enabled to recognize 
malicious activity on their workstations or even prevent potentially malicious activity 
through thoughtful use of their workstations and access to the Internet. As shown in 
Figure 1, the MAST Network consists of two parts: a Scenario Execution (SE) Server 
hosted by the local network and a Scenario Generation (SG) Server. This figure depicts 
the ability of MAST to remotely configure, initiate, monitor, and terminate Simware 
modules on the host network of the simulation audience. Network administrators and 
local network users may receive MAST-aided training and assessment on any LAN 
regardless of the geographical location of the participating network. Whether at an 
established headquarters, a forward deploying unit, or on a ship underway, access to the 
GIG provides the SG Server with connectivity to the local SE Servers. From the SG 
Server, the evaluator verifies participating SE Servers are on-line and pushes any 
revisions or additions to Simware module libraries maintained on the local SE Servers. 
Execution of the Simware module is ordered by the evaluator through the SG Server and 
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carried out locally by the SE Servers. Status of the simulation on each local network is 
monitored by the local safety observers through information retrieved by the SE Server. 
The same information is relayed to the evaluator at the remote location through the SG – 
SE Server command and control channel. All data is retained and archived by the SE 
Servers. Further detail regarding the individual components of MAST is provided next. 
 
Figure 1.  MAST Architecture Overview.  From [3]. 
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1. The MAST Suite 
MAST provides the unit commander with the ability to develop and test the skills 
to recognize and respond to cyber attacks in unit network administrators. It also creates 
an environment that lends to development and modification of until-level, cyber attack 
casualty response procedures. MAST is constructed as a server-client architecture. It 
consists of a SE Server, a database server that collects all associated data, and the client 
applications of the MAST software loaded to each network workstation participating in 
the simulation. The SE Server contains and executes the Simware modules. It provides a 
graphical user interface (GUI), which equips the simulation master with functionality 
necessary to select which Simware to execute and to control the execution of that 
Simware. The participating audience is determined by the installation of the MAST client 
application on a workstation. The Simware, once executed, will only run its course on 
workstations connected to the same network as the SE Server and running the MAST 
client application. The MAST suite may be considered the “MAST-light” system. 
Although not fully the MAST system, it is an autonomous entity able to execute scalable, 
safety, and realistic simulation of malware and malicious activity [4].  
2. The Scenario Generation Server 
Although very much a part of the MAST system, the SG Server is considered its 
own entity whose functionality may be divorced from the rest of the MAST system 
without affecting the system’s ability to execute its core capabilities. The SG Server 
provides the ability to dictate the functionality of SE Servers as part of its parent-child 
relationship established remotely through network connectivity with all participating SE 
Servers. In addition, the SG Server may delete, add to, or modify existing Simware 
modules in Simware module libraries of any SE Server it is connected to. The network 
connectivity also allows remote monitoring of Simware execution conducted by each 
connected SE Server. This combined functionality completes the MAST system by 
providing a single, remote location with the ability to safely execute and control [4]. 
Since our research scope focuses specifically on the network hosting the simulation, we 
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will only be testing the MAST compatibility with our test LANs running the COMPOSE 
environment. In our testing of MAST, we will not including the SG Server functionality. 
G. PROOF OF CONCEPT FOR A MALICIOUS ACTIVITY SIMULATION 
TOOL 
Hayes produced a summary of the three waves of thesis research projects 
associated with the MAST program in Chapter II of his thesis, “A Definitive 
Interoperability Test Methodology for the Malicious Activity Simulation Tool (MAST)” 
[6].  
• First Wave: Taff and Salveski 
• Second Wave: Neff/Longoria 
• Third Wave: Hayes/Makhlouf and Littlejohn 
The foundation for this project was laid by Taff and Salveski. Their research established 
that a software system could be created to mimic malicious activity on a network without 
actually deploying malware on the network. Their thesis, “Malware Mimics for Network 
Security Assessment,” described the concept of utilizing simulated adversarial teams to 
attack networks and how their research software system could provide an equivalent 
training environment. The characteristics of the system constructed by Taff and Salveski 
were [2]: 
• It was safe enough for production or operational environments. Emulated 
behavior would cease on command and “roll back” to a pre-exercise state. 
Losses of network connection were treated as instructions to cease 
behaviors. This would allow training to take place on the same network on 
which the trainees perform their mission. 
• Only malware behaviors were constructed, not actual malware itself. 
Though (they) demonstrated the properties of a notional worm on the 
network, there was no actual malware involved. 
• The system constructed was distributed across the network, allowing the 
trainer to be located anywhere on the network, local or remote. 
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Neff followed Taff and Salveski’s research by verifying and validating their proposal that 
their malware mimic software system, which Neff re-labels as the MAST system, is a 
viable tool for conducting network security training. Neff described various attack 
methods used by network security training teams during network attack simulations. He 
defined and tested metrics, which he used to compare the MAST with other DoD network 
security training tools [3]. He concluded that the MAST system was capable of producing 
equal training quality to that of the training methodologies used today. In addition, he 
explained that the MAST system was capable of presenting real world simulation through 
updated malware modules shaped to represent present day network attacks. Longoria’s 
research assessed the MAST Software’s ability to be remotely deployed to networks of 
varying sizes with little to no impact on the network or its resources [4]. His research 
demonstrated the MAST software could be deployed to as many as 80 workstations on a 
network without placing a significant load on the Simulation Execution (SE) server’s 
central processing unit (CPU). In addition, the overall network traffic increase due to 
Simware deployment was minimal. Additionally, Longoria showed that the MAST 
clients installed on each workstation participating in the training simulation successfully 
transmitted its reports to the SE server. He concluded that each instance of the MAST 
client software reported all user actions and pertinent local machine information to the SE 
server as they occurred [4]. Transmission of user action reports from both the clients to 
the SE server placed minimal additional burden on the transmitting machine’s CPU. 
Hayes’ research laid the ground work for the quantitative testing we will perform 
in our research. Hayes captured the current DoD and DON testing and implementation 
methodologies for cyber programs [6]. Specifically, Hayes identified testing objectives, 
milestones, and metrics as well as the methodology for a quantitative testing of MAST. 
He shaped and developed test procedures that, if followed, would test and aid the 




In this chapter, we discussed the nature and employment of malware. We 
identified the tenets of information security: Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. 
We explained how something or someone can pose as a threat to a network, its systems, 
or the information within through attacking one of several of these security objectives. 
We also explained that most threat agents fall into one of three groups: criminals, 
hacktivists, or government/government-sponsored agents. We provided a definition of 
malware and described seven different categories of malware. We discussed how a 
criminal, hacktivist, or government/government-sponsored attacker would conduct 
malicious activity to enable their attacks on systems. We described some of the cyber 
security initiatives in the DoD. Finally, we provided an overview of MAST. 
In the next chapter, we will describe the concept behind the implementation of the 
MAST program as a training and assessment tool. We will also include a brief overview 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 31 
III. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
MAST is designed to provide realistic, tailored simulation of malicious activity to 
facilitate effective cyber readiness. To create a realistic simulation scenario requires three 
factors:  
• Simulation executed in a real computing environment  
• Simulation of real malicious activity 
• Safety and scalability  
In the first factor, “real” refers to an operational computing environment in which 
the simulation audience may encounter malware or malicious activity. In the second 
factor, “real” refers to malware or malicious activity actually present in the wilds of the 
Internet. The types of malware and malicious activity discussed in Chapter II reflect real 
malware and real malicious activity. The final factor is also essential to a simulation. 
Without the ability to safely confine the execution of a simulated malware or malicious 
activity to the time and manner desired, it is erroneous to assume a “simulation” could 
not potentially become an actual occurrence of malware or malicious activity. Also, the 
realistic effect of a simulation is hampered if the simulation cannot scale to meet the 
needs of its audience or environment. This chapter describes how these factors are 
accounted for in the COMPOSE testing environments and the MAST Simware.  
A. PROVIDING A DON COMPUTING ENVIRONMENT 
As mentioned in Chapter II, previous research projects proved the functionality of 
MAST as well as its scalability while operating in a virtual COMPOSE environment. Our 
research moves the project forward by assessing the MAST system’s ability to execute all 
functions as designed while running in a COMPOSE environment on a physical network.  
We decided to execute our testing in two separate environments. One 
environment would be a MAST Test Bed built at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). 
The other would be the NCOR in Norfolk, VA. Testing MAST on the MAST Test Bed 
meets the intent of our research. Even so, a successful test and evaluation of the MAST 
functionality on the MAST Test Bed does not negate the need to test MAST on a 
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COMPOSE network certified and accredited to access the GIG. Testing MAST and its 
Simware on the MAST Test Bed would provide a clear indication of its compatibility 
with our instance of a shipboard-simulating COMPOSE environment. Testing of MAST 
on NCOR would give our results the authenticity that only comes from operational 
testing on a certified and accredited network.  
1. The MAST Test Bed Environment 
The MAST Test Bed that models a shipboard network did not exist at NPS at the 
beginning of this research project. So we constructed and configured a physical network 
in our research laboratory space. The MAST Test Bed needed to model the operational 
requirements of a shipboard network. It was designed for the sole purpose of replicating, 
not mirroring, a properly configured, operational Navy shipboard network.  
Considering that the scalability of the MAST system was proven by Longoria 
through his research, it was unnecessary to match the capacity or complexity of any Navy 
shipboard network [4]. Its anti-virus software, intrusion prevention program and firewall 
for the network and the individual workstations are configuration in accordance with 
DoD and DON policies. This was very important to the success of our research because it 
is the intent of MAST to create test modules tailored to produce the desired response 
when run on an operational network. While running a Simware module scenario, an error 
in indications or functionality would point to either an error in the module’s design or a 
misconfiguration in the COMPOSE network. Unlike an operational network, we did not 
pursue GIG-connectivity for the MAST Test Bed. Next, we describe the hardware and 
software used in creating the MAST Test Bed. Table 1 provides a summary and maps 
hardware to software: 
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Server Name Server Function
MASTCNDOSE
ESXi
Host Based Security System (HBSS)
Microsoft Windows Server 2003
Secure Configuration Compliance Validation Initiative 
(SCCVI)
Microsoft SQL Server (MSSQL)
Microsoft Windows Server 2003
MASTUCSEX002
Windows Server 2003
Microsoft Exchange 2003 Secondary Server
Internet Information Server (IIS)
 Network News Transfer Protocol (NNTP) Server 
MASTUCSMS001
Windows Server 2003
SQL Server 2005 Standard
Internet Information Server (IIS)
SMS Distribution Point
Systems Management Server (SMS)









File and Print Services
COMPOSE Distribution Server
Primary Windows Internet Naming Service (WINS)
Primary Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)





File and Print Services
Internet Security and Acceleration Server (ISA)
Secondary Windows Internet Naming Service (WINS)
Secondary Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)
Secondary Domain Name System (DNS)
MASTUCSEX001
Windows Server 2003
Microsoft Exchange 2003 Primary Server
Internet Information Server (IIS)
Web Server
SharePoint Server
 Network News Transfer Protocol (NNTP) Server 
 




The primary requirement for our test environments is the existence of the 
COMPOSE environment deployed on U.S. Navy ships. Deployment of the COMPOSE 
environment requires four basic components: Servers, a router, switches, and 
workstations. The requirements for the MAST Test Bed did not exceed this level of 
specificity, so no great effort was placed in hardware selection above ensuring we 
possessed these basic network building blocks. The NPS Test Bed was constructed 
utilizing pre-existing equipment in the Computer Science Department reserves. Due to 
practical reasons, we opted to use six physical workstations. Our Servers, router, and 
switch were stored in a Dell PowerEdge 4220 Rack Enclosure. The hardware 
specifications of our equipment are as follows: 
• Server (7): Dell™ Poweredge™ 1950 Server (2 x 2.66 GHz, Quad-Core 
Intel® Xeon® 5300 processors; 12 Gb, Fully-Buffered DIMMs, 4 x 500 
Gb 3.5” SATA hard drives.) 
• Router (1): Cisco® 2811 Integrated Service Router 
• Switch (2): Dell™ PowerConnect™ 2716 (16 x 1-Gigabet Ethernet ports) 
• Workstation (6): Dell™ OptiPlex™ GX620 Ultra Small Form (2.8 GHz 
Intel® Pentium® 4 processor with Intel® 945 Express support chip; 2 Gb 
533MHz, DDR2 memory; 250 Gb hard drive) 
The network topology depicted in Figure 2 shows a connectivity to the 
Internet through the NPS network. This connection was only a temporary one used to 
download software and firmware upgrades required during the software installation and 
configuration process. Once finished, the connection was removed, ensuring an isolated 
environment to run the MAST Simware modules. The second switch (192.168.100.x), 
attached to the Test Bed router, allows for the simulation of an external network. This 
external network, still isolated from the NPS network, and therefore the Internet, 
facilitates future testing of the SG Server and its remote control of the MAST Suite. In 
addition, the external network provides the ability to simulate malicious activity initiated 




Figure 2.  NPS MAST Test Bed Network Topology with Nomenclature 
b. Software 
The software required to emulate a shipboard COMPOSE network is 
grouped into packages, which we will refer to as loads. We required two loads to 
properly establish the NPS Test Bed. The first COMPOSE load contains the software 
needed to create the network. The COMPOSE load, version 3.5, was donated by the 
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) Program Office for Tactical 
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Networks (PMW-160). The second load delivers the Computer Network Defense-
Operating System Environment (CND-OSE), which includes the DoD-mandated 
Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), the Host-Based Security System (HBSS). HBSS is a 
McAfee® intrusion prevention and policy management software. It detects, and prevents 
known cyber-threats and is required to be installed on each server and client in DoD. 
CND-OSE, version 2.0, was donated by the SPAWAR Program Office for Information 
Assurance and Cyber Security (PMW-130). Both were provided with 120-day operating 
licenses. All servers were configured with a 20-Gigabyte “C” drive system partition and 
230-Gigabyte “D” drive partition. Both partitions were configured as 32-bit NFTS. 
Microsoft® Windows Server® 2003 R2 Standard was installed on the six servers 
implementing the COMPOSE load. The seventh server utilized VMware ESXi™ 
implement the CND-OSE load. ESXi™ is a hypervisor that creates and controls virtual 
connections between the three CND-OSE Servers to the physical memory and processors 
of the host server. The use of a virtual environment to run the CND-OSE does not negate 
the physical LAN requirement of our testing. All CND-OSE suites deployed on board 
U.S. Navy ships utilize the same configuration for its three servers.  
(1) MAST Test Bed Domain Controllers .  MASTUCSDC001 
and MASTUCSDC002 function as the domain controllers for the COMPOSE network. 
Both DC001 and DC002 functioned as complimenting domain controllers. DC001 
provided the following additional service: COMPOSE Distribution Server, Global 
Catalog Server, Primary Windows Internet Naming Service (WINS) Server, Primary 
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) Server, Primary Domain Name System 
(DNS) Server, and Symantec Anti-Virus™ Server. DC002 provided the secondary 
WINS, DHCP, and DNS Servers.  
(2) MAST Test Bed Exchange Servers.  Just as with domain 
controllers, COMPOSE environments provide redundancy to the important role of the 
network’s exchange servers. MASTUCSEX001 and MASTUCSEX002 function as the 
exchange servers. Both host the Microsoft® Exchange 2003 Server® Standard Edition 
and Microsoft® Internet Information Server (IIS). EX001 also hosts the network’s web 
server and Microsoft® SharePoint Server®. 
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(3) MAST Test Bed Microsoft® Mission Management 
Server®.  MASTSMS001’s primary function is the Microsoft® Mission Management 
Server® (MMS). It is also loaded with Microsoft® SQL Server 2005 Standard, IIS, and 
the SMS software distribution server. 
(4) MAST Test Bed File Server.  MASTUCSFS001 functions 
as the network file server as well as its home directory server. It also maintains the share 
drive and all user profiles. 
(5) MAST Test Bed CND-OSE Server.  As mentioned 
previously, this physical server, running VMware ESXi™, hosts the virtualized 
environment for the CND-OSE suite. The CND-OSE suite is virtually implemented to 
isolate its security functionality from the rest of the COMPOSE environment. The 
following four, virtualized servers comprise the CND-OSE suite: the Host-Based 
Security System (HBSS), the Microsoft® SQL Server® (MSSQL), the Secure 
Configuration Compliance Verification Initiative (SCCVI), and the Secure Configuration 
Remediation Initiative (SCRI). The full CND-OSE suite was loaded to the server as a 
measure of thoroughness. In previous works, Lieutenant Commander Neff and Captain 
Longoria provided detailed descriptions of the HBSS and its role in the COMPOSE 
environment [3], [4]. Only the HBSS suite is required by our testing environment criteria. 
The HBSS suite is actually a collection of McAfee network security products managed 
by the e-Policy Orchestrator (ePO) application loaded on the HBSS Server. From the 
ePO, McAfee ePO and Host-based Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) agent 
applications were deployed to the Test Bed Servers and workstations. Through the 
interconnections between the ePO and the individual McAfee ePO and HIPS agents, we 
pushed DoD and DON security policies to the Test Bed Servers and workstations. These 
policies were applied to the servers and workstations by the hosted agents. The agents 
networked servers and workstations are configured to poll the ePO in pre-determined 
time intervals for any new policies or updates to existing policies. If any are received, the 
agents apply them to their host machine. Any detected violations of applied policies are 
reported by the ePO and HIPS agents both locally for host user situational awareness but 
also remotely to the ePO console through the existing interconnection. In order to ensure 
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resilience in the ability to prevent, detect, track, and report malicious activities on the 
network, the CND-OSE installation instructions do not direct the deployment of the 
McAfee anti-virus agent to the individual servers and workstations. Instead, COMPOSE 
networks utilize Symantec’s enterprise anti-virus solution. As mentioned earlier, 
Symantec Anti-Virus™ Server is loaded on MASTUCSDC001. Like the ePO, the anti-
virus server possesses the ability to push both anti-virus agents, configuration policies, 
and policy updates to all networked assets. Also like the ePO and HIPS agents, the anti-
virus agents communicate alerts and warning locally and remotely to the anti-virus 
server. This feature allows the host machines to act as sensors for the both the ePO and 
anti-virus servers. Between the two, the network administrators and security personnel 
have the mechanisms necessary to maintain situational awareness of the cyber security 
posture of their networks as well as detect and respond to any malicious activity. The 
combined functionality provided by the HBSS and Symantec Anti-Virus™ Server 
installations on the MAST Test Bed is also provided in the NCOR testing environment, 
which will be described next. 
2. The NCOR Environment 
Of the cyber test ranges researched and recommended by Lieutenant Hayes, we 
selected to conduct part of our research-related testing on the NCOR [6]. As mentioned in 
Hayes’s work, NCOR provides DON with an arena of computing and networking 
capability in an isolated environment. This isolation allows for freedom to conduct cyber 
training, exercise, and test and evaluation events that might otherwise pose a threat to 
operational or production networks. Utilizing the COMPOSE environment, this arena 
allows the engineers the flexibility to change the stage to meet the needs of its customers. 
The majority of the time its customers are Navy network defenders. They utilize NCOR 
to provide them with a cyber dojo in which the trainers show the students attacks at a 
digestible pace. In this dojo, the students learn to recognize attack vectors and how to 
defend against these attacks. Their trainers can repeat the attack as many times as 
necessary for the students to recognize the attack and instinctively deploy the defense. 
This enables the reinforcement of their training, the honing of their recognition and 
response skills, and even aids in the development of unit camaraderie. The same 
 39 
flexibility needed to change or remove the NCOR defense-in-depth layers as necessary 
for training also allows for the creation of whatever stage is needed to conduct testing and 
evaluation events. Whether the test subject is a human or a computer program, the 
evaluators can work with NCOR engineers to adjust its simulated shipboard network 
configuration as necessary to create the desired environment. Given the commonality 
between NCOR’s ability to provide a cyber dojo and MAST’s aim to make a cyber dojo 
available at the unit level, plus the fact that the NCOR engineers use and are familiar with 
the COMPOSE environment, NCOR is the natural fit for our secondary test environment. 
Of the simulated domains provided by the NCOR engineers, only the CVN-65 domain 
met our testing criteria of a fully-configured COMPOSE environment integrated with the 
HBSS-suite [28]. The CVN-65 domain’s COMPOSE load was version 3.0.1, an older 
version than the MAST Test Bed’s 3.5 COMPOSE load. This disparity was assessed and 
deemed not an eliminating factor. 
B. SIMULATING MALWARE AND MALICIOUS ACTIVITY 
When designing simulations of malware and malicious activity, the designer has 
to know the capabilities of the target audience and the operational network he is trying to 
replicate. In the interest of fiscal judiciousness, it is an unsound practice to train a 
network administrator, whether in the private sector or in the military, on how to respond 
to malicious behavior that is beyond the scope of his capabilities to detect or the 
capabilities of the network security defenses with which the administrator is equipped to 
defend his network. In his research, Hammond suggests that malicious behavior may be 
viewed as falling into one of four categories as depicted in Figure 3 [5]. 
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Figure 3.  Malicious Behavior Detection Diagram. From [5]. 
Hammond offers that any malicious behavior on a network should be treated as 
part of a group. The grouping is determined by whether or not the malicious behavior is 
detectable by a user (to include network administrators) and whether or not the behavior 
is detectable by network security features, such as the HBSS. Taking this into account, 
we designed our Simware modules to replicate malicious behaviors that only fall into 
Groups 1 and 2. Although not denying the existence of the significant volume of Group 3 
and 4 malware and malicious activities, the intent of the MAST project is to generate a 
realistic, and therefore beneficial, training tool. Simulation of Group 3 and 4 malicious 
behavior is of no training value and falls outside of the scope of this research. 
1. Developing Training Scenarios 
Existing Simware modules were created for the purpose of testing the MAST 
system’s functionality. Viruses and drive-by downloads are examples of malicious 
activity still posing a threat to networks worldwide. Previous MAST research projects 
successfully developed and utilized Simware modules that present the simulation 
audience with an accurate simulation of a malicious behavior. In addition to replicating 
malicious behavior, the Simware modules facilitate dynamic evolution allowing for 
secure or insecure audience reaction to the simulation. Behind the scenes of the 
interaction between the module execution and the simulation audience, the module design 
also supports reporting and archiving of data associated with the module execution. See 
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Longoria [4] for a more thorough explanation of the features and functionality of a 
MAST Simware module. Figure 4 depicts how the MAST system executes the simulation 
of a drive by download [4]. 
In our research, we focused on the potential training scenario a unit would face 
when participating in a MAST training evolution. Our training scenario enables the 
assessment of user compliance with network usage policies and the effectiveness of DoD-
mandated, annual information systems security awareness training. The Simware 
modules created to deliver a training scenario provide the trainer or assessor the 
flexibility to utilize individual Simware modules to focus on the simulation audience’s 
response to one particular malicious activity or combine Simware modules to present a 
more complex evolution.  
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Figure 4.  Example of a MAST Simware Scenario.  From [4]. 
2. A Training Scenario Example 
In shaping the design criteria for our training scenario, we focused on the 
COMPOSE network and its security posture. Behind DoD and DON-provided security 
services, the COMPOSE networks on U.S. Navy ships may be viewed as internal 
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networks. Like the private sector, DON internal networks are most susceptible to security 
threats introduced by their users. Security features and policies are in place to obscure 
and protect the internal networks from the external threats. One vehicle for allowing an 
external threat to gain access to a COMPOSE network is e-mail. Spam filters and 
exchange servers are configured to minimize the delivery of e-mails containing malicious 
attachments or links to COMPOSE inboxes. Even so, unless e-mail is turned off it is 
impossible to fully eliminate this threat vector. In addition, access to the Internet allows 
users to utilize web-based e-mail services. In some cases, the security features of web-
based e-mail accounts are less protective than those of COMPOSE e-mail accounts. This 
results in an increase in the vulnerability of the internal network to external threats. 
Whether opened from a DON-protected e-mail account or a web-based e-mail account, 
the actions of opening a malicious e-mail occur on the local workstation. Any malicious 
code tied to the e-mail, unless blocked by network security policies and configurations on 
the local workstation, executes and runs its course internal to the network. As explained 
in Chapter II, the code may simply manipulate the user’s web browsing session or it may 
start a series of events that creates an open lane of communication between an external 
threat agent and the internal workstation.  
Limiting the scenario to Group 1 and Group 2 malicious behaviors, we produced 
the following training scenario: 
 44 
 
Figure 5.  MAST Training Scenario 
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The training scenario depicted in Figure 5 involves the delivery of an unsigned e-
mail. True to the modularity of the MAST design, the e-mail may contain either a 
malicious link or a malicious attachment. In this scenario, we depict a malicious link 
Simware module. Per [29], digital signatures are required on e-mails containing active 
links or attachments. Neither the Simware module containing a malicious link nor the 
Simware module containing a malicious attachment will produce a signed e-mail 
intentionally to test whether or not the simulation audience complies with the DoD-
mandated Information Systems Security Awareness training. The training prohibits the 
clicking on hyperlinks or attachments contained in unsigned e-mails because it may 
install malware on the system.   
The scenario begins with the arrival of the malicious e-mail in the user’s inbox 
and may take on several different paths before completion. If the user deletes the e-mail, 
the training scenario ends. If the user clicks on the malicious hyperlink, the Simware 
module tied to this training scenario generates a simulated virus. Based on system 
descriptions, we anticipated a creation of security event alerts by both the host HBSS 
client and Symantec anti-virus software locally and remotely. The initiation of the 
simulated virus gives the trainer the opportunity to verify user and network administrator 
compliance with existing security threat training, tactics, and procedures (TTPs). It also 
allows for verification of proper configuration and function of the HBSS Suite and 
Symantec anti-virus software on each participating workstation. If the Simware 
successfully generates the simulated virus, a properly configured anti-virus application 
should recognize it, respond to it, and report it both locally and remotely to the Symantec 
anti-virus server loaded on MASTUSCDC001. The HBSS client application should also 
generate an alert locally and remotely to the ePO console loaded on the CND-OSE 
Server. Any discrepancies would require verification of compliance with configuration 
and security policies and possible troubleshooting. 
C. SAFETY AND SCALABILITY OF MAST SIMULATIONS 
Scalability and safety of a simulation is essential to the delivery of any training 
value by the use of said simulation. Scalability of the MAST system, as mentioned 
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before, was successfully tested and verified by Longoria [4]. The MAST system is 
designed to provide training opportunities in an operational network. However, no unit 
commander will authorize the use of the MAST system on their operational network 
unless they have faith in the ability to secure any active Simware modules and restore 
their network to its full operational posture when necessary. Navy ships temporarily 
reduce their operational readiness in support of combat systems training evolutions with 
full faith that the information systems used to simulated adversarial actions may be 
returned to their normal operating modes at any moment. Longoria’s thesis describes the 
MAST safety features that deliver the capability to stop any Simware module and fully 
restore the network at a moment’s notice. He described the client check-in feature that 
identifies the participating workstations. Only network workstations possessing MAST 
clients that have checked in will receive anything from the SE Server. If a Simware 
module must be secured before completion of its scenario, the trainer may use the MAST 
“Kill Switch” available to both a local trainer through the SE Server and remotely to a 
remote trainer through the SG Server. His research proved its functionality in a virtual 
network. We extend his descriptions by addressing a fourth safety feature of the MAST 
system:  all MAST Simware modules are contained and controlled. 
Use of a simulation that cannot be properly contained and controlled may damage 
the training value desired from its use. It may also damage the training environment in 
which it is deployed. It is easier to make this point when considering a training munition 
used to simulate an actual munition. Even though the training munition contains a 
fraction of the explosive material found in the larger munition it aims to simulate, if 
improperly detonated, the force could still result in training audience injury or training 
space damage. This is not the case with MAST Simware modules. In addition to the 
capability to secure a simulation and restore the operational network to full capacity 
when necessary, the safety of the network is baked into each Simware module. For 
example, existing Simware modules simulating a virus utilize the EICAR anti-malware 
test file. Created by the European Institute for Computer Anti-virus Research (EICAR), 
the test file is used to verify the proper operation of anti-virus software in operational 
networks [30]. The use of the EICAR test file presents no threat to a real network because 
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it is not a virus. It is a simple DoS program that tells the anti-virus program it is a test file. 
The code for the file is as follows: 
X5O!P%@AP[4\PZX54(P^)7CC)7}$EICAR-STANDARD-
ANTIVIRUS-TEST-FILE!$H+H* 
In the code, you can see the text “EICAR-STANDARD-ANTIVIRUS-TEST-
FILE!”  This is what is displayed in any alert generated by an anti-virus program when 
the file is detected. This is just an example of the overall effort to safely implement the 
MAST system. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter described the design phase of our research. We explained our reason 
for testing MAST in two separate testing environments: the MAST Test Bed and NCOR. 
We explained the design of the MAST Test Bed and the research we conducted to ensure 
it modeled a shipboard network. We then explained the NCOR test environment and its 
role in supporting the DoN cyber security initiatives. We identified differences between 
the MAST Test Bed and NCOR and explained how we accounted for these differences in 
our research. Finally, we explained the design process for the Simware modules used in 
our test and evaluation of MAST. 
In the next chapter, we will discuss the methodology of our test and evaluation of 
the functionality of the MAST system on the NPS Test Bed and NCOR CVN-65 
COMPOSE LANs. 
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IV. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
This chapter describes our assessment of MAST’s compatibility with the 
COMPOSE environment. The purpose of our research is to determine if MAST is 
capable of executing the defined simulation in compatibility with the COMPOSE 
operating system running on a physical network. We begin with a description of the 
investigative efforts made to better understand the COMPOSE environment. We explain 
the measures taken to ensure the MAST Test Bed replicates the COMPOSE environment 
employed by most U.S. Navy shipboard operational networks. We discuss the creation of 
the MAST Test Bed and the development of the MAST Simware modules. We describe 
the logical and physical differences between the NCOR and the MAST Test Bed. Finally, 
for both test environments, we provide the methodology used in our assessments of 
MAST as well as an analysis of the results from the MAST evaluations conducted in test 
environment. 
A. ESTABLISHING THE TEST ENVIRONMENT 
Chapter III outlines the design considerations for the test environments. Having 
knowledge of what components are used to form the COMPOSE environment is 
insufficient to create a working implementation of the COMPOSE environment. 
Installation and configuration details are also needed. For this, we reached out to the 
Information Assurance and Cyber Security Program Office (PMW-130) and the Tactical 
Networks Program Office (PMW-160). In addition to generously providing COMPOSE 
and CND-OSE installation packages with temporary test licenses, both management 
offices provided technical assistance during the installation and configuration of the 
MAST Test Bed. Through direct access to SPAWAR installation engineers, we were able 
to troubleshoot through several configuration issues affecting the exchange server and the 
HBSS client deployment. Prior to receiving the installation packages, we gained 
familiarization of the Microsoft® Exchange Server installation and configuration process 
in one of our classes, CY4700, Cyber Wargame: Blue Force Operations. This class 
required the students to design and develop the network it would later defend against 
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attacks from the red team class, CY4710, Cyber Wargame: Red Operations. Given the 
option of which mail server to utilize in the blue team network, we selected and installed 
Microsoft®’s Exchange Server 2008. Lessons learned from the deployment of the blue 
team mail server helped considerably during the COMPOSE installation and enabled us 
to properly identify installation issues when requesting troubleshooting assistance from 
the SPAWAR installation engineer. 
To facilitate realistic Simware module development, we required a better 
understanding of HBSS and how it interacts with the COMPOSE environment. To begin, 
we completed the HBSS introductory training and management courses offered by the 
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) through the CERT® Program’s Virtual 
Training Environment (VTE). To help us with the installation process, the SPAWAR 
Systems Center, Pacific (SSC Pacific) Training Development and Support Center 
(TDSC) provided us with installation, configuration and troubleshooting guides for the 
CND-OSE environment, version 1.2. PMW-130-provided CND-OSE installation 
engineers helped us resolve issues encountered during our CND-OSE server and HBSS 
installation, to include the prevention of a potential source of recurring performance 
issues. The DISA Information Assurance Support Environment (IASE) website supports 
HBSS versions up to, and including 4.6. The version of HBSS used by shipboard 
networks is version 4.2 [31]. Had we installed and rolled out policies available for the 
latest version of HBSS, the environment would not have mirrored those found on U.S. 
Navy ships, thus resulting in a less authentic experiment. Also, given the unique 
characteristics of the COMPOSE environment, running a more recent version than HBSS 
4.2 may have resulted in errors during testing that were not related to the MAST system 
or its Simware modules. Finally, just as we were able to benefit from lessons learned in 
CY4700 during the installation and configuration of our COMPOSE Exchange server, the 
installation and configuration of the MAST Test Bed HBSS suite was aided by our 
experiences gained by installing and configuring the blue team network’s HBSS suite in 
CY4700. 
Possessing a working replica of a shipboard network in our lab at NPS enabled us 
to test and evaluate the functionality of MAST and its Simware modules against a 
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COMPOSE environment. To ensure that MAST and Simware modules were compatible 
with the NCOR CVN-65 domain, we convened two planning meetings with the staff at 
NIOC Norfolk. The first was at NIOC Norfolk, the second via video teleconference 
(VTC). NCOR engineers and red team instructors answered our compatibility questions, 
explained configuration settings, and even provided constructive feedback on a few of 
our ideas regarding Simware modules [32]. 
B. THE MAST TEST BED (NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL) 
1. MAST Test Bed Construction 
As mentioned in Chapter III, the MAST Test Bed was constructed utilizing 
servers, routers, switches, racks, and workstations readily available in the Computer 
Science department’s reserves. We faced several obstacles while constructing the MAST 
Test Bed. First, the COMPOSE and CND-OSE software loads required upgrades once 
installed. Also, the Symantec Anti-Virus ™ software and HBSS ePO required updates to 
signatures and policies.  
One of the safety features of the MAST Test Bed is its lack of connectivity to an 
outside network. In the interest of time, we decided that the MAST Test Bed would be 
connected temporarily to the Internet via the NPS Research Network to facilitate 
downloading necessary patches and signature updates. In order to connect our router to 
the NPS Research Network, we had to request permission from the NPS Information 
Technology and Communications Services (ITACS). The request entailed several steps. 
First, the router’s Media Access Control (MAC) address was added to port security 
policy of the local NPS Research Network switch. Second, ITACS assigned a static IP 
address to the MAST Test Bed router. The static IP address served two purposes. This 
allowed the router to be authorized, thus preventing it from being denied access to the 
NPS Research Network by the anti-router policy. The IP address was also used to 
identify the MAST Test Bed as exempt from the network access scans conducted by 
SafeConnect, a proprietary network access control solution produced by Impulse Point 
[33]. It enables NPS to enforce network access policy compliance by scanning all 
computing devices requesting connectivity to the NPS Research Network. Any device not 
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properly configured, running software that is not properly patched, or that is using 
outdated anti-virus signatures is denied access to the network. Once the MAST Test Bed 
software was properly patched and anti-virus signatures were updated, the router was 
disconnected from the NPS Research Network. The static IP address continued to remain 
authorized and available for reconnection to the NPS Research Network. 
2. MAST Simware Module Development 
For our testing, we chose to simulate three malicious activities: 
• Malicious Port Scan 
• Malicious E-mail 
• Malicious Pop-Up Window 
They provide a simulation that tests MAST’s ability to trigger system responses 
that warrant action, either by the COMPOSE environment in the form of an alert or fail 
safe response, or by the network administrator or user. A MAST software engineer, Mr. 
Greg Belli, provided us with a virus Simware module that produces the EICAR test file. 
A Malicious Pop-Up Window Simware module already existed as part of his ongoing 
research associated with MAST. He also developed several port scans with different 
functionalities [7]. The root functionality of all MAST Port Scan Simware modules is 
provided by the Network Mapper or NMAP utility.  
NMAP is an open source application that enables network administrators and 
security personnel to conduct network surveying and auditing. According to the SANS 
Institute’s white paper, “Conducting a Penetration Test on an Organization,” NMAP port 
scans produce sensitive information about the network including: which operating 
systems are running on the associated servers and workstations and what services are 
available on the network based upon which packets do and do not penetrate the network’s 
firewall [34]. The collection of this information from a network is possible because of the 
exploitation of RFC 793, as explained in Chapter II. In keeping with the constraint of 
producing simulation for only Group 1 and Group 2 malicious behaviors, none of the Port 
Scan Simware modules conducted scans that could be considered covert or so slow as to 
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evade detection. Details regarding Simware module code and its development will be 
addressed in Mr. Belli’s future thesis.  
Initial testing of the Port Scan Simware modules during development produced 
unexpected errors. Investigation identified a conflict in the version of Java MAST was 
compiled in and the version of Java loaded in the MAST Test Bed COMPOSE 
environment [35]. MAST originally was compiled using Java version 1.5. The MAST 
Test Bed COMPOSE environment utilizes Java version 1.6. Once re-compiled with Java 
version 1.6, all Port Scan Simware modules functioned properly. Additionally, there were 
anomalies during pre-test development of the Port Scan Simware modules. Initially, the 
SE server was loaded to the MAST Test Bed File Server (MASTSMS001). When 
running the Fast Port Scan Simware module, we noticed that, in addition to detecting the 
scan, the Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) application on the targeted 
workstation blocked all traffic from the source of the scan (MASTSMS001) for fifteen 
minutes. This fifteen minute block was part of the HBSS security policies. As a result of 
the block we were unable to run an additional Simware module for fifteen minutes. 
3. Test Methodology 
Our test methodology is influenced by the Operational Test Director’s Manual 
(COMOPTEVFORINST 3980.2) [9] and draws from the quantitative testing process 
presented by Hayes [6]. As stated in [6], there were three overall objectives of our 
quantitative testing of the MAST Software. The first objective was to assess the 
compatibility of the MAST Software with the COMPOSE environment while idle. The 
second objective assessed MAST’s compatibility with the COMPOSE operating system 
while executing Simware modules. The third objective was to verify the functionality of 
the MAST Kill Switch on a physical network. As stated in Chapter III, Longoria’s 
research proved the functionality of the MAST Kill Switch in a virtual environment [4]. 
One of the core purposes of testing MAST on a physical network is to verify that the 
commands tied to implementation of the Kill Switch were carried out properly. Operation 
of the Kill Switch at any point during the execution of a Simware module should result in 
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immediate halt of the module and a full restoration of the network to its operational status 
prior to commencement of the Simware module.  
In shaping the test plan for the MAST Test Bed portion of our research, we 
divided our test plan into three phases: installation of the MAST Software, execution of 
Simware modules, de-installation of the MAST Software. During each phase, our test 
plan required collection of information that established and documented the operational 
state of the COMPOSE environment. This operational state was treated as the baseline 
status of the test network. Knowledge of this baseline status would then enable us to 
determine whether or not the MAST Software caused any adverse impact to the network 
at any point while following the test plan. This might indicate an incompatibility between 
the MAST Software and the COMPOSE environment. The baseline information also 
enabled the accomplishment of the first objective of our quantitative testing.  
The scope of the NPS Test Bed test plan is the NPS Test Bed, the MAST SE 
server, the MAST clients, and the associated malicious software simulations or Simware 
modules. Critical operational issues to be examined are: 
• Ensure MAST is compatible with a COMPOSE environment in an idle 
state 
• Ensure execution of the MAST Software while running Simware modules 
does not hamper functionality of a COMPOSE environment 
• Ensure the ability of the MAST Kill Switch to fully restore the test 
environment to its previous operational status. 
The following sections provide detailed descriptions of the three phases of our 
testing.  
4. MAST Installation Test Procedures 
a. Pre-Deployment of MAST 
The objective of this portion of the test procedure is to ensure full 
knowledge of the COMPOSE environment running on the test network. For the purpose 
of these test procedures, the phrase “participating workstations” refers to all testing 
network’s workstations that will be monitored during the test (Work Stations 01 – 06, See 
Figure 6). Also, for the duration of the Simware module testing, “testing workstations” 
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refers to the group of network workstations running the MAST client (Work Stations 01 – 
04, See Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6.  NPS MAST Test Bed Network Topology with Device Role Identified 
In the case of the NPS Test Bed, there are six physical workstations. Four 
workstations will be MAST workstations that will run the MAST clients and consist of 
the audience of workstations in the simulation modules. Two workstations will act as 
controls. They will not be loaded with the MAST client. They will not participate in the 
simulation modules. All simulation activity should be undetected on the control 
machines. All six workstations are clarified as “participating workstations.” 
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Step Procedure 
1 Identify server loads on domain controllers, servers, and workstations 
2 Map network topology 
3 Inspect event viewer on all servers and participating workstations 
4 Identify critical services on Domain Controllers 1 and 2 
5 Identify critical services on Exchange Servers 1 and 2, Management Server, 
and File Server 
7 Verify file, registry setting, etc. (See Registry Integrity Checks) 
8 Verify functionality of software applications including Microsoft Suite 
(Word, Excel, Access, PowerPoint, Outlook, and IE) (See MS Suite 
Functionality Checks) 
7 Conduct Host Resource Usage Checks (See Host Resource Usage Checks) 
10 Conduct additional TBD inspections if defects or disruptions are discovered 
while accomplishing Test 2.1 steps 1 - 9 
Table 2.   MAST Pre-Installation Test Procedures 
b. Post-Deployment of MAST 
This portion of the installation test procedure assesses the impact to the 
NPS Test Bed, the MAST workstation, and the participating workstations loaded with 
MAST clients.  
 
Step Procedure 
1 Start SE server on the MAST Server. 
2 Start MAST clients on participating workstations 
3 Inspect event viewer on all servers, and all participating workstations 
4 Identify critical services on Domain Controllers 1 and 2 
5 Identify critical services on Exchange Servers 1 and 2, Management Server, 
and File Server 
6 Verify critical services on all participating workstations 
7 Verify file, registry setting, etc. (See Registry Integrity Checks) 
8 Verify functionality of software applications including Microsoft Suite 
(Word, Excel, Access, PowerPoint, Outlook, and IE) (See MS Suite 
Functionality Checks) 
9 Conduct Host Resource Usage Checks (See Host Resource Usage Checks) 
10 Conduct additional TBD inspections if defects or disruptions are discovered 
while accomplishing Test steps 1 - 9 
Table 3.   MAST Post-Installation Test Procedures 
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(1) Microsoft® Suite Functionality Checks.  These 
functionality checks are conducted on the MAST workstation and all participating 
workstations onto which the MAST client was loaded. For each machine, the 
functionality checks are conducted for each MS Suite Program (e.g., Word, Excel, 
PowerPoint, etc.) loaded on that machine. 
 
Step Procedure 
1 Open Event Viewer. Monitor Applications Log throughout functionality checks 
2 Open MS Suite program 
3 Create a test file using this MS Suite program 
4 Save the file locally 
5 Save the file to the network share drive 
6 Close MS Suite program 
7 Open test file from its local storage location 
8 Open test file from its network share drive location 
9 (For MS Exchange) Send e-mail to test administrator account 
10 (For MS Exchange) Send e-mail from test administrator account to client 
account 
11 Conduct additional TBD inspections if defects or disruptions are discovered 
while accomplishing Test 2.2.1 steps 1–10 
Table 4.   MS Suite Functionality Checks 
(2) Host Resource Usage Checks.  These resource usage 
checks are conducted on the MAST workstation and all participating workstations onto 
which the MAST client was loaded. 
 
Step Procedure 
1 Identify the amount of disk space consumed by the application on MAST 
server and workstations. 
2 Inspect the % of CPU usage on MAST server and workstations 
3 Inspect the pages/sec memory usage on MAST server and workstations 
4 Inspect send/receive bytes count of network adapter on MAST servers and 
workstations 
5 Verify no HIPS warnings occurred during MAST software installation on MAST 
sever and workstations 
6 Conduct additional TBD inspections if defects or disruptions are discovered or 
significant increase in CPU usage occurs while accomplishing Test steps 1–6 
Table 5.   Host Resource Usage Checks 
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(3) Registry Integrity Checks.  The following integrity check  
is conducted on any server or workstation onto which the MAST client and  
server is loaded. For each machine, the registry checks are conducted for each 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE registry subtree on that machine. 
 
Step Procedure 
1 Start Regedt32.exe 
2 Select each registry root HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE 
3 From the menu bar, File and then Export 
4 Click Save as type 
5 Select Text files 
6 Save the file as reg.old or, for post MAST install, reg.new   
7 Run Windiff from the Microsoft Support\Tools and compare the two files, 
reg.old and reg.new. (omit for preinstall) 
Table 6.   Registry Integrity Checks 
5. Simware Module Test Procedures 
The testing workstations were monitored for data involved in the simulation 
activity. The term “participating workstations” referred to the testing workstations and 
the control workstations. Data was collected from all participating workstations during 
each Simware module test procedure. All Simware modules were tested using the 




1 Capture system time 
2 Start SE server 
3 Start MAST client on testing workstations 
4 Select and execute Simware module from SE Server  
5 Verify start of nmap on MAST workstation 
6 Collect data from servers and participating workstations. Save to “Test Data” 
folder 
7 Inspect event viewer on servers, and all participating workstations 
8 Identify critical services on Domain Controllers 1 and 2 
9 Identify critical services on Exchange Servers 1 and 2, Management Server, 
and File Server 
10 Verify critical services on MAST workstation and all participating workstations 
11 Verify file, registry setting, etc. (See Registry Integrity Checks) 
12 Verify functionality of software applications including Microsoft Suite (Word, 
Excel, Access, PowerPoint, Outlook, and IE) (See MS Suite Functionality 
Checks) 
13 Conduct Host Resource Usage Checks (See Host Resource Usage Checks) 
14 Conduct additional TBD inspections if defects or disruptions are discovered 
while accomplishing Test steps 1 - 13 
 
Table 7.   Simware Module Test Procedures 
During our Simware module testing we ran simulations that captured the three 
malicious activities mentioned above: 
• Malicious Port Scan 
• Malicious E-mail 
• Malicious Pop-Up Window 
Explanation of the expected functionality of the individual Simware Modules 







Malicious Activity Simware 
Module 
Summary 
   
Malicious Port Scan Services Only 
Scan 
Only scans for ports listed in NMAP’s services 
file 
 Fast Port Scan NMAP scans full range of ports in shortest 
time 
 Covert PING 
Scan 
Sends SYN and ACK flags in place of TCP Ping 
 XMAS Tree Scan Sends FIN, URG, and PSH packets to identify 
open ports  
   
Malicious E-mail Malicious E-mail 
with Text File 
Generates e-mail with text file attachment 
containing EICAR test string. 
 Malicious E-mail 
with Batch File 
Generates e-mail with batch file, which 
produces the EICAR test string when 
executed. 
   
Malicious Pop-Up 
Window 
 Clicking on window’s buttons results in EICAR 
test string generation on host workstation. 
 
Table 8.   Simware Module Summary Table 
We assume that a more detailed explanation of the software that delivers this 
simulation will be provided in Belli’s forthcoming thesis. 
a. Port Scan Simware Modules 
The TCP port scan executed by the port scan modules should be detected 
and blocked by the Host Intrusion Protection System (HIPS) on each testing workstation. 
The detection and blocking action should be reported locally on each workstation and 
also at the ePO management console. MAST SE server should receive reports from each 
MAST client indicating time scan started and time scan stopped. 
(1) Services Only Scan Simware Module.  This module 
conducts a TCP port scan using NMAP and the switch “-F.”  It limits the port scan on a 
named IP address to only those ports listed in the NMAP services file.  
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(2) Fast Port Scan Simware Module.  From his tutorial on 
using NMAP to conduct stealthy port scans, Bennieston explains how the timing with 
which NMAP conducts its port scans may be controlled using the “-T” parameter. “There 
are six predefined timing policies which can be specified by name or number (staring 
with 0, corresponding with Paranoid timing). The timings are Paranoid, Sneaky, Polite, 
Normal, Aggressive and Insane. A –T Paranoid (or –T0) scan will wait (generally) at 
least 5 minutes between each packet sent”  [36]. For this module, we used the parameter 
of –T5, which equals to the timing setting of Insane. It covers all ports very quickly, 
possibly at the expense of losing some data. 
(3) Covert PING Scan Simware Module.  This scan utilizes the 
PING switch (-P) to send SYN and ACK packets in the place of a TCP Ping. This module 
will execute the “NMAP –PS” followed by the “NMAP –PA,” both across the same 
range of IP addresses. This scan simulates an attacker attempting to establish if a host is 
on the network. The result is similar to using a PING, without sending a PING packet. 
This captures the intent of the PING utility on a network where security policies might 
prevent PINGs between workstations. 
(4) XMAS Tree Scan Simware Module .  This scan shapes the 
TCP frame sent from the SE server to contain the flags FIN, URG, and PUSH. Per RFC 
793, the incoming TCP segments, not containing RST flags, should result in a responding 
TCP segment containing a RST flag for any port CLOSED on the workstation [23]. If the 
port is OPEN or if the workstation contains a stateful firewall, the NMAP report for this 
scan lists the port as “OPEN | FILTERED” [23]. It is called a XMAS Tree scan because 
the TCP segment flags that are on (00101001) resemble the blinking lights of a Christmas 
tree. 
b. Malicious E-mail Simware Modules 
The detection and response to malicious e-mails generated during these 
simulations depends on which Simware module is executed. Both begin with the SE 
server directing a MAST client to generate the malicious e-mail. The malicious e-mail is 
the vehicle for a malicious attachment. Both should result in the generation of the EICAR 
test string (see Chapter III for explanation).  
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(1) Malicious E-mail with Text File Simware Module .  After 
producing the malicious e-mail, the MAST client should generate a text file. The text file 
should contain the EICAR test string. Who the MAST client sends this malicious e-mail 
with EICAR text file to is determined by the e-mail addresses entered in the module prior 
to execution. Once the e-mail is transmitted, the automated scan conducted by the anti-
virus software loaded to the MAST client’s host workstation should identify the EICAR 
test string as a virus and strip the text file. This tests the proper configuration and 
operation of the Symantec anti-virus client application. Should the text file not be 
stripped and reach the intended recipient mail boxes, detection and quarantine of the 
EICAR test string should occur locally if the user selects to read the text file attached to 
an unsigned e-mail (in violation of DoD IA policy). 
(2) Malicious E-mail with Batch File Simware Module.  In this 
scenario, the designated MAST client creates two variables each containing half of the 
EICAR test string. A batch file is then created that combines the two variables to form 
the EICAR test string once executed. Given the prior knowledge that a batch file would 
most likely be stripped by the host workstation’s Symantec anti-virus application during 
scanning, some social engineering is employed to enable the attachment to bypass the 
automated scans. The MAST client saves the batch file (.bat) as a text file (.txt) 
attachment to the e-mail. In the message body, the e-mail contains instructions to convert 
the .txt file to a .bat file in order to view the contents. Should the user do so, the .bat file 
should execute producing the EICAR test string. Local detection and quarantine of the 
file should occur as previously discussed. 
c. Malicious Pop-Up Window Simware Module 
This module is designed to test the end user’s compliance with the security 
practices outlined in the DoD-mandated Information Systems Security Awareness 
training. The MAST client loaded to the testing workstations should locally produce a 
pop-up window. These windows should appear once the SE server executes the scenario 
and without any interaction from the user on the testing workstations. We simulate users 
at two of the testing workstations clicking on the button contained in the pop-up window 
to test the module’s ability to simulate a resultant infection of the host machine. Clicking 
 63 
on the radio button should result in local generation of the EICAR test string. If the 
EICAR test string is generated, local detection and quarantine of the file should occur as 
previously discussed.  
d. MAST Kill Switch Testing 
Once all testing of the Simware modules are complete, each Simware 
module will be run again, this time testing the functionality of the MAST Kill Switch. 
The Simware Module Test Procedures (Table 7) will act as the MAST Kill Switch Test 
Procedures with one revision. A new step, “Utilize the MAST Kill Switch from SE 
server,” will be added following step 11 of Table 7. The remaining portion of Table 7 
will be completed as part of this test.  
e. MAST De-installation Procedures 
MAST is a portable application that does not actually install any software. 
As a portable application, MAST does not write any configuration files to the host 
operating system and it does not write any data to the system registry. We copied MAST 
from a portable media (CD) to the root, “C,” drive of the host using the copy-and-paste 
functions in the windows environment. Since there is no installation of program files 
associated with MAST, there is no de-installation procedure for MAST. When verifying 
MAST’s compatibility with the COMPOSE environment in an idle state, we had to start 
the MAST server and all participating workstations. 
6. Test Results 
Overall, our testing verified the capability of MAST while functioning on a 
physical network utilizing the COMPOSE operating system. Installation of MAST on the 
MAST Test Bed physical network did not adversely impact the COMPOSE operating 
system. During the execution of the Simware modules, neither the dynamic state of the 
SE server nor the MAST clients produced any indication of negative effect on the MAST 
Test Bed servers or workstations that would impinge upon their operational status. 
Additionally, when utilized, the MAST Kill Switch successfully cancelled the running 
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Simware module and returned the MAST Test Bed to the operational status it was in 
prior to commencement of the Simware module. 
a. MAST Functionality 
As anticipated, the MAST installation went smoothly and was uneventful. 
Given the success of past theses whose research rested on the firm foundation of a 
properly installed and functioning MAST, there was little reason to expect significant 
compatibility issues. Potential sources of incompatibility were errors due to variance in 
COMPOSE versions and errors due to configuration errors. Lieutenant Commander Neff 
and Captain Longoria conducted their research on a virtual implementation of the 
COMPOSE version 3.0 environment [3], [4]. The MAST Test Bed uses COMPOSE 
version 3.5. As mentioned earlier, a compatibility issue involving the JAVA version used 
to compile the Simware Module was identified and remedied during pre-test Simware 
module development. In addition to the variance in the COMPOSE versions, ensuring a 
proper installation and configuration of the COMPOSE version 3.5 on the MAST Test 
Bed was vital in creating a controlled testing environment. The early involvement of 
SPAWAR installation engineers, our Fleet expertise and familiarity with the COMPOSE 
environment, and a slow, methodical, and well-managed installation process all 
contributed to the successful creation of a proper replica of an operational shipboard 
network. Our functionality checks produced no identified defects or disruptions to the 
availability and operation of the MS Suite. The host resource usage check verified the 
MAST installation presented no significant change in the CPU usage of either the 
network servers or workstations. With the exception of the initial jump in CPU usage 
associated with starting the Windows Task Manager application, the CPU usage 
throughout the installation process averaged 2%. 
b. Simware Module and MAST Kill Switch Execution 
The successful installation of MAST verified its compatibility with a 
COMPOSE environment while in an idle state. The successful execution of all tested 
Simware modules not only verified MAST’s compatibility with a COMPOSE 
environment while operational but also verified its ability to provide a realistic simulation 
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of malicious activity in a non-virtual network. The compatibility and functionality of the 
Simware modules was confirmed as a side effect of the Mast Simware module 
development prior to testing. However, testing of each Simware module in accordance 
with the test procedures prescribed in [6] was necessary to validate the findings of our 
research.  
 
Figure 7.  MAST Graphical User Interface (GUI) 
Each of the Simware modules identified in Section 5, Simware Module 
Test Procedures, were tested twice: once to verify the Simware’s ability to properly 
simulate the intended malicious activity, and, second, to verify the proper operation of the 
MAST Kill Switch. Figure 7 shows the MAST GUI prior to the execution of one the 
XMAS Tree Scan Simware module tests. The GUI indicates the scenario to be executed 
is the XMAS Tree Scan. Four MAST clients are connected but only one was needed to 
run the scenario. Once the green “play” button was clicked, it was replaced on the GUI 




previously. Like all Simware modules, CPU usage monitoring presented no indication 
that execution of the XMAS Tree Scan Simware module required significant use of host 
resources. 
 
Figure 8.  CPU Utilization of Workstation Conducting XMAS Tree Scan 
Figure 8 shows the CPU performance graph for the SE server host. Box 1 
shows the initial spike in CPU usage associated with starting the SE server. Box 2 shows 
the MAST “heartbeat,” or signal used to communicate information to and from the 
connected MAST clients. Box 3 shows the beginning of the XMAS Tree Scan using 
NMAP. CPU usage on the SE server host machine only temporarily increased and 
aligned with the anticipated CPU usage for this Simware module. 
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Figure 9.   CPU Utilization of Workstation Detecting XMAS Tree Scan  
In Figure 9, we see the CPU performance graph from one of the 
participating workstations running a connected MAST Client. The workstation’s IP 
address was listed in the XMAS Tree Scan Simware module as one of the target IP 
addresses. Box 1 shows the MAST heartbeat verifying a live connection with the SE 
server. Box 2 shows the increase in CPU usage associated with the host machine’s HIPS 
application detecting and blocking the inbound port scan. All workstations targeted by 
the XMAS Tree Scan Simware module showed similar CPU performances and received 
the same spike in CPU usage during detection of the attack. Figure 10 shows the alert 
window produced by the HIPS application on the target workstation.  
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Figure 10.  McAfee Notification of Detected Attack 
 
Figure 11.  History Log of the Attacked Workstation’s HIPS agent 
An additional indicator of the scan is found in the history logs of the 
HBSS-generated McAfee host client loaded to the workstation (discussed in Chapter III). 
Figure 11 shows the continued reporting of the presence of the scan as well as the 
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continued verification of the functionality of the McAfee Data Loss Prevention (DLP) 
Agent. When running a Simware module that could result in the simulated infection of a 
workstation, like the Malicious Pop-up Window, the MAST client of the simulated 
infected machine would send an indication of the infection back to the SE server. 
Infection of the connected clients was successfully reported and tracked during our 
testing. Figure 12 shows the GUI during the testing of the Malicious Pop-Up Window 
Simware module (labeled here as the “drivebydownload.txt”). During the test, we clicked 
on the pop-up window’s button. This triggered a simulated infection of the workstation, 
resulting in the generation of the EICAR test string. The infection was reported by the 
MAST Client to the SE server and indicated on the GUI. 
 
Figure 12.  MAST GUI Indicating an Infected Workstation.  From [35]. 
Once the Simware module completed the intended simulation of malicious 
behavior, the MAST clients remained connected to the SE server. Once the local Safety 
Observer clicked on the MAST GUI’s “stop” button, the roll back sequence commenced. 
The module was stopped, its termination was logged in the MAST database, and any 
scripts deployed by the SE server to a MAST client were rolled back. However, the 
“heartbeat” or connection between the MAST clients and the SE server was maintained.  
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During the tests of the MAST Kill Switch, we observed the same Simware 
module roll back sequence. The clear difference between the two functions is the 
termination of the MAST clients on all participating workstations. Utilizing the “stop” 
function enables the Safety Observer to load an additional Simware module and continue 
simulations. Utilizing the MAST Kill Switch sent a termination signal to the participating 
workstations to close the MAST clients. In each test of the MAST Kill Switch, the 
connection between the MAST clients and the SE server was severed and the host 
workstations were fully restored to their previous operational status.  
C. NAVY CYBER OPERATIONS RANGE (NCOR) (NIOC NORFOLK, VA) 
Testing of MAST on the NCOR was a success. We tested the same three Simware 
modules: the port scan, the malicious e-mail, and the malicious pop-up windows. 
Equipped with these Simware modules, we simulated many different forms of malicious 
activity. For port scans, we utilized the same NMAP flags to simulate Services Only, 
Fast, and XMAS Tree scans of the NCOR workstations. Like the MAST Test Bed tests, 
we needed scans that were noisy, meaning they executed port scans that would be easily 
detected by the McAfee HIPS application. Using the Malicious E-mail Simware, we 
simulated an unsigned e-mail containing a malicious attachment sent to the victim e-mail 
account from both internal and external e-mail accounts. The Malicious Pop-Up Window 
and its ability to simulate viral infection of the host machine was also successfully 
verified. After minor configuration changes, software updates, and a few Simware 
adjustments, we successfully ran all tests in accordance with the test plan described by 
[6]. Functionality of the Kill Switch was tested and verified for all Simware. Attacks 
were simulated both from one machine to another and from one machine to many. 
1. NCOR vs. MAST Test Bed 
Testing the Simware on the MAST Test Bed gave us the proper baseline 
necessary for a successful test at the NCOR. Even so, the successful test and evaluation 
of our Simware on the MAST Test Bed did not negate the need to test MAST and its 
Simware on the NCOR. The NCOR is an official DON cyber range. It is certified and 
accredited to access the Global Information Grid. NCOR has supported several Joint and 
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National cyber exercises. Testing MAST and its Simware modules on the MAST Test 
Bed provided clear indication of its compatibility with our instance of a shipboard-
simulating COMPOSE environment. Testing of MAST and its Simware on the NCOR 
gave our results the authenticity that only results from operational testing on a certified 
and accredited network.  
 
Figure 13.  NCOR Network Topology. From [28]. 
We used different versions of the COMPOSE operating system on NCOR and the 
MAST Test Bed. NCOR COMPOSE version was 3.0.1. The MAST Test Bed 
COMPOSE version was 3.5. No errors in MAST functionality or Simware module 
execution were anticipated given the success of previous MAST research conducted with 
the same COMPOSE version as NCOR. The MAST Test Bed is a physical network. In 
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order to deliver the flexibility required of the NCOR, the CVN-65 and CG-48 networks 
were virtual networks. Figure 13 depicts the NCOR topology. Our testing was conducted 
on ship-emulated networks housed by the VM Host-1 (See bottom left-hand corner). 
2. Test Methodology 
The objective of the NCOR testing was to assess MAST’s compatibility with 
COMPOSE and verify the MAST Kill Switch functionality. The same test plan used 
during testing on the MAST Testbed at NPS was used during NCOR testing; however, an 
additional Simware module test was added and will be discussed below. The scope of 
NCOR testing was the NCOR, the MAST SE server, the MAST clients, and the 
associated Simware modules. This differed from the scope of the MAST Testbed because 
the NPS Testbed was eliminated and the NCOR was added. The critical operational 
issues of this test were the same.  
In addition to the Simware module tests conducted during testing on the MAST 
Test Bed, we added one test to the NCOR testing. We tested the ability to externally 
generate a malicious e-mail and send it to an internal e-mail account. During our 
introductory conference with the NCOR engineers, we discussed the feasibility of this 
test. It was decided that sending an e-mail from an e-mail account external to NCOR 
(e.g., from an NPS e-mail address) to a NCOR e-mail account was not possible [37]. 
However, a user account with e-mail address was created on the NCOR’s CG-48 domain. 
Sending an e-mail generated by MAST on the CG-48 domain to an e-mail account on the 
CVN-65 domain would meet the intent of the test of an external e-mail exchange while 
remaining internal the NCOR. The MAST Installation Procedure and Simware Module 
Test Procedures were followed. In this case, host resource usage was conducted on both 
the CG-48 workstation and all CVN-65 workstations hosting connected MAST clients. 
3. Test Results 
Our NCOR testing achieved the same level of success as our tests on the MAST 
Test Bed. MAST’s compatibility with the NCOR COMPOSE load was proven and its 
Kill Switch successfully rolled back all simulations conducted on both the CVN-65 
domain and CG-48 domain. Per the training scenario discussed in Chapter III, it was 
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necessary to prove that MAST Simware modules were able to produce actionable 
indications to stimulate responses from both users and network administrators. Our 
NCOR and MAST Test Bed tests verified both local and remote indication of the 
malicious behaviors simulated by the Simware modules. 
The malicious behaviors simulated by MAST Simware modules were reported by 
the attacked workstation’s McAfee host clients to the HBSS ePO management console. 
In the management console, threat reports were either logged in the Threat Event Log or 
the IPS Log. Viral infection simulations tied to a Malicious Pop-Up Window or 
Malicious E-mail Simware module were registered in the HBSS Threat Event Log. All 
port scans tied to a Port Scan Simware module were registered in the HBSS Host IPS 
Log. Figure 14 shows the individual Threat Log entry for one of the EICAR Test String 
detections.  
 
Figure 14.  HBSS Event Detail of EICAR Test String Detection 
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D. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we discussed the methodology applied to the testing of MAST’s 
compatibility with the COMPOSE environment operating on a simulated, shipboard, 
physical network. We also tested its ability to produce a realistic simulation of malicious 
behavior and its ability to terminate that simulation and fully restore the network to its 
previous operational status. The tests conducted on the MAST Test Bed verified MAST’s 
ability to provide network users and administrators with realistic malicious scenarios for 
training or assessment purposes without detrimental impact to the operational readiness 
of its host network. Our successful tests on the certified and accredited Navy Cyber 
Operations Range re-enforced our findings.  
In Chapter V, we provide the conclusions drawn from our research. In addition, 
we provide guidance received during our research on how to improve upon MAST’s 
usefulness to the Fleet. Finally, we will close with lessons learned from our research and 
suggestions for future work. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. SUMMARY 
In this thesis, we analyzed the compatibility of MAST with the COMPOSE 
environment running on a physical network modeled after a shipboard operational 
network.  
In Chapter II, we set the foundation for understanding the threats MAST aims to 
simulate. We identified the three fundamental objectives of network security. We 
explained how vulnerabilities act as imperfections in a network’s armor exposing it to 
various threats. The nature of threats present on the Internet today has caused a shift from 
a binary concern for either viral infection or worm propagation to a multi-front battle to 
prevent authorized access to networks and the information contained within. Network 
administrators and security personnel face external and internal efforts to profile their 
network in order to gain exploitable information about the network. We described the 
general categories by which most threat agents may be grouped. We explained how these 
agents utilize malicious software and malicious activities to advance toward their goal of 
gaining and maintaining access to your network. 
In Chapter III, we detailed our design considerations. We presented a perceived 
misunderstanding of the defensive readiness of individual DoD networks connected to 
the GIG. In the pursuit for increased offensive and defensive capabilities to produce 
strategic affects in cyberspace, the lack of ability for unit network administrators to 
provide for the self-defense of their operational networks gets little attention. We 
explained how MAST provides unit commanders the ability to train their network 
administrators to recognize and respond to malicious behavior that penetrates their 
network through the imperfections in its armor. To do this, MAST must deliver 
simulations of real malicious activity in a real computing environment in a safe and 
scalable manner. We provided detailed information on how these factors were accounted 
for in the selection and design of the COMPOSE testing environments. 
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In Chapter IV, we discussed the methodology and results of our experimentation. 
We described the research conducted before testing began to ensure our test 
environments provided the shipboard network replication our hypothesis rested on. Most 
of this description addressed the creation and configuration of the MAST Test Bed, since 
the NCOR testing environment is a certified and accredited COMPOSE network. During 
Simware module pre-test development, we worked with Belli to verify that the simulation 
delivered during execution matched the intent of the module. Once armed with proven 
Simware modules, we conducted our computability experiments on the MAST Test Bed.  
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Our successful testing of MAST’s operational features on the MAST Test Bed 
verified MAST’s ability to produce realistic, tailored, scalable simulation of malicious 
activity without degrading any of COMPOSE capabilities. This ability was validated by 
the successful outcome of our NCOR experiments. The most important control for our 
experiments was the presence of a proper installation and configuration of the 
COMPOSE environment. We were fortunate to receive a more recent version than that 
used in the virtual tests of MAST (version 3.5 versus version 3.0.1). One pre-
experimental variable in our experiment was installation and configuration errors due to 
inexperience with the process. A shipboard instance of the COMPOSE version 3.5 
environment was installed by a SPAWAR COMPOSE Installation Engineer who had 
experience with several installations experience. Although lacking in the type of 
experience that may minimize errors, three factors reduced the window for error this pre-
experimental variable introduced. For both COMPOSE and CND-OSE, the installation 
and configuration process was guided by SPAWAR manuals, aided by our combined 
operational experience with both operating system environments, and augmented by 
distance support from COMPOSE and CND-OSE Installation Engineers.  
A key lesson learned from our research is the importance of the SPAWAR 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) Chair at NPS. 
All technical assistance provided by PMW-130 and PMW-160 would normally require a 
contract between the PMW offices and the recipient of the technical support hours. 
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Instead, Dr. Rachelle Goshorn, NPS C4I Chair, worked with the leadership at SPAWAR 
to identify us as a research effort. The costs associated with the technical support we 
received were funded by SPAWAR and significantly minimized thanks to her 
intervention and guidance.  
Another key lesson learned is the benefit gained by interacting with not only the 
NCOR team but also NIOC Norfolk as a whole during our NCOR testing phase. Having 
the opportunity to display MAST in operation, explain its purpose, and solicit feedback 
from one the U.S. Navy commands responsible for training sailors to support the DCO 
mission and assess the operational readiness of Navy networks was invaluable. We 
present our case for continued collaboration with the NCOR in the next section.  
The success of this research answered our thesis. MAST can function on a LAN 
using the COMPOSE operating system with high confidence that it will respond as 
directed. After successfully reaching the same conclusion at NCOR, our results from the 
MAST Test Bed experiments were reinforced. 
C. FUTURE WORK 
1. Continued Collaboration with the NCOR 
The NCOR is certified and accredited to connect to the GIG. As such, NIOC 
Norfolk utilizes the NCOR to conduct re-familiarization training of its previous students 
at their current commands remotely via Virtual Private Networks (VPN) [38]. This ability 
to establish secure connections with geographically-dispersed networks presents an 
excellent opportunity to conduct future MAST experimentation. A VPN between MAST 
and the NCOR would enable the connection of MAST to multiple networks. This remote 
connection would allow for future functionality tests of the SG server and its capabilities. 
A VPN with the NCOR would enable testing of the SG server’s ability to load, define, 
execute, monitor, and secure a simulation scenario remotely on two networks (CVN-65 
domain and CG-48 domain) simultaneously. Additionally, it would provide the ability to 
test and develop Simware modules that deliver simulation of externally generated 
malicious activity. Collaboration with the NCOR via VPN on future MAST research 
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would bring greater realism to the experimentation while significantly reducing the 
amount of associated travel funds. 
2. Further Advancements in Simulation 
Chapter II presented threats faced by any network connected to cyberspace. No 
Simware module library would ever be able to produce scenarios necessary to simulate 
all threats; not all threats are known. Also, as explained in Chapter III, when training, it is 
not reasonable to simulate malicious activity beyond the ability of the network 
administrator or his relatively basic security tools to detect. However, we propose several 
additional avenues of simulation to improve upon MAST’s relevance to today’s larger, 
more well-known threats.  
We propose the creation of one or more malicious websites. A malicious website 
would improve upon MAST’s ability to simulate social engineering attacks. In keeping 
with the scalability criteria of MAST, these malicious websites would act as blank canvas 
upon which the scenario developer may select the malicious threat to present the training 
audience. We explained in Chapter II how a malicious e-mail may be sent to the training 
audience with a hyper-link, which would direct the user to a malicious website containing 
drive-by downloads. Figure 14 is a revision of the training scenario presented in Chapter 
III (Figure 5). The highlighted sections show how a malicious website would support the 
delivery of simulated malicious behavior for training and assessment purposes. 
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Figure 15.  MAST Training Scenario Employing Malicious website 
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As a safety feature, this website would be provided with an internal IP address 
that would not resolve outside of the participating operational network. This provides  
containment should the e-mail be forwarded to an external e-mail account. The website 
would either be hosted by the web server of the participating network or networks. To 
avoid configuration errors and to afford MAST more control over its simulations, 
developing a web server as part of the deployed MAST package may be in order. By 
utilizing a MAST web server, the command employing MAST for remote purposes could 
define the web server IP address assignment and any necessary host network 
configuration settings in the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed by the 
participating command or commands prior to commencement of MAST simulation. This 
alleviates the participating command of any responsibility for the web server’s settings. 
MAST, to include the MAST web server, would be deployed as a package configured 
and ready for use. 
A recommendation received during our testing at the NCOR was to implement a 
simulation of a botnet Command and Control (C2) server [32]. Bots, also discussed in 
Chapter II, require communication with their master in order to receive and execute their 
master’s bidding. In order to hide their identity, botnet masters will utilize C2 servers 
separate from them to automatically provide command and control to their bots. The bots 
are designed to deploy on their host workstation and, utilizing the host’s access to the 
Internet, call out to the pre-programmed IP address of the C2 server. This callout signals 
their existence and queries for instructions. Regarding simulation of a C2 server 
communicating with a bot, there are several options. One is to configure the MAST web 
server to send traffic to legitimate IP addresses from a spoofed, external IP address. 
Another would be to create a Simware module that requires the host workstation to send 
packets to an IP address that will not resolve off the host network. For example, the IP 
address is a private IP address not associated with the host network but blocked by the 
host network’s outbound firewall settings. In both cases, the intent is not to pursue the 




security threat to the host networks. Instead, the intent is to create internally-generated 
traffic that would be detected and identified as potentially malicious, either by log 
analysis or by HIPS alert.  
3. Fleet Operational Tests of MAST 
To date, all MAST research, both ours and that summarized in Chapter II, shaped 
and guided the functionality of MAST toward its end objective of supporting the war 
fighter on their operational network by providing simulated malicious behavior for the 
purpose of enhancing their command’s operational readiness and security posture in 
cyber space. The next logical step in progressing MAST toward operational deployment 
in the Fleet is to test it on an operational network with human interaction and 
participation. TRIDENT WARRIOR, the DON vehicle for conducting at-sea 
experimentation of both technology and the tactics used in employing them [39], is an 
excellent candidate for this next step. Testing MAST on an actual shipboard network 
would further validate the results of our research as well as provide the opportunity to 
collect end-user feedback. 
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